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THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM:
JUDGE JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.'S
IUSTORIOGRAPHY OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
CHARLES J. REID, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a scholarly and professional career now spanning a half century,
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. has produced path-breaking works in a
number of disciplines. Noonan first trained as a philosophy doctoral
student at the Catholic University of America where he authored an
important thesis analyzing the Church's law and moral teaching
regarding usury.' Since then, he has written a number of important
studies about the interaction of Catholic moral doctrine and law,
including comprehensive studies concerning contraception,2 marriage
and divorce,3 and abortion.4  He also has authored a series of
* Dr. Charles J. Reid, Jr. is Research Associate in law and history at Emory University
School of Law. He thanks John Witte, Jr. and Kathleen Brady for reading and commenting
upon earlier drafts of this article. This article is dedicated to Caroline Victoria Reid, born
February 26,1999, the newest member of the Reid family.
1. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Banking and the Early Scholastic Analysis of Usury
(1951)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America). A substantially
expanded version of the thesis was subsequently published by Harvard University Press. See
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957). See also JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 25-31 (1998) (reminiscing on Catholic University experiences); Kevin Starr, Judge
John T. Noonan, Jr.: A Brief Biography, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 151,159-61 (1994-95) (reviewing his
studies at Catholic University).
2. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Do The Right Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, § 7, at 34
(reviewing CHARLES CURRAN, THE CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION TODAY: A SYNTHESIS);
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC
THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (Enlarged ed., 1986); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE CHURCH
AND CONTRACEPTION: THE ISSUES AT STAKE (1967); John T. Noonan, Jr., The History of
Contraception" Seven Choices, in THE CONTRACEPTIVE ETHOS (Stuart F. Spicker et al. eds.,
1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., Natural Law, the Teaching of the Church and the Rhythm of Human
Fecundity, 25 AM. J. JURiS. 16 (1980); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Amendment of Papal Teaching by
Theologians, in CONTRACEPTION: AtrHORITY AND DISSENT 41 (Charles E. Curran ed., 1969);
John T. Noonan, Jr., Authority, Usury, and Contraception, CROSS CURRENTS 55 (1966); John T.
Noonan, Jr., Tokos and Atokion: An Examination of the Natural Law Reasoning Against Usury
and Contraception, 10 NAT. L. F. 215 (1965). Cf. John T. Noonan, Jr., Intellectual and
Demographic History, 97 DAEDALUS 463 (1968) (considering the "mythic-moral ideas" which
have shaped thought on human populations in western history. 1d, at 465).
3. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE
COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA (1972). See also John T. Noonan, Jr., Marital Affection in the
Canonists, 12 STUDIA GRATIANA 479 (1967); John T. Noonan, Jr., Power to Choose, 4 VIATOR
419 (1973); Novel 22, in THE BOND OF MARRIAGE: AN ECUMENICAL AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (William W. Bassett ed., 1968); John T. Noonan, Jr., Marriage in
Michoacdn, in FIRST IMAGES OF AMERICA: THE IMPACr OF THE NEW WORLD ON THE OLD
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biographical articles concerning leading canon lawyers of the twelfth
century! Additionally, he has written many thoughtful pamphlets,
essays, and articles on scholastic philosophy (especially in its moral
dimension),6 biblical studies,7 celibacy in the early Church,8 American
351 (Fredi Chiappelli et. al. eds., 1976); John T. Noonan, Jr., Ursa's Case, in DIVORCE AND
REMARRIAGE IN THE CHURCH 29 (Lawrence Wrenn ed. 1973); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
Indissolubility of Marriage and Natural Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 79 (1969); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
History and the Values of Christian Marriage, in MARRIAGE IN THE LIGHT OF VATICAN 11 1
(James T. McHugh ed., 1968); John T. Noonan, Jr., Freedom, Experimentation, and Permanence
in the Canon Law on Marriage, in LAW FOR LIBERTY: THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE CHURCH
TODAY 52 (James E. Biechler ed., 1967); John T. Noonan, Jr., Genital Good, 8 COMMUNIO 198
(1981) (reviewing issues of sexual morality generally).
4. See John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970); John
T. Noonan, Jr., On the Priority of Life, in THE PASTORAL VISION OF JOHN PAUL II (Joan Bland
ed., 1982); John T. Noonan, Jr., Responding to Persons: Methods of Moral Argument in the
Debate over Abortion, 24 THEOLOGY DIG. 291 (1973); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Church
and Abortion, 12 NATURAL L. FORUM 85 (1967); Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., How TO ARGUE
ABOUT ABORTION (1974) (handbook detailing arguments against abortion); JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., ABORTION IN OUR CULTURE (1980) (criticizing foundations of contemporary acceptance of
abortion).
5. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of the
Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35 TRADITIO 145 (1979); John T. Noonan, Jr., Who Was
Rolandus?, in LAW, CHURCH, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STEPHAN KUTTNER 21
(Kenneth Pennington & Robert Somerville eds., (1977); John T. Noonan, Jr., The True
Paucapalea, in THE CRITICAL STUDY OF SACRED TEXTS 179 (Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty
ed., 1979); John T. Noonan, Jr., Paucapalea, in DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 466
(1982). Cf John T. Noonan, Jr., Catholic Law School A.D 1150, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1189
(1998) (reviewing legal method utilized in twelfth century universities).
6. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Natural Law Banner, in NATURAL LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY 380 (David F. Forte ed., 1998); John T. Noonan, Jr., The
Metaphors of Morals, in RIDING TIME LIKE A RIVER: THE CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION
SINCE VATICAN 1135 (William J. O'Brien ed., 1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., Three Real Relations,
66 PROC. AM. CATH. PHILOS. ASS'N 73 (1992); John T. Noonan, Jr., Stars of the Order:
Brilliance, Diversity, Reflecting and Reflected Light, 41 SPIRITUALITY TODAY 101 (1990); John T.
Noonan, Jr., The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher, 56 PROC. AM. CATH. PHILOS.
ASS'N. 1 (1982); John T. Noonan, Jr., Masked Men: Person and Persona in the Giving of Justice,
48 PROC. AM. CATH. PHILOS. ASS'N. 228 (1974); John T. Noonan, Jr., Making One's Own Act
Another's, 27 PROC. CATH. THEOLOGICAL SOC. OF AMERICA 32 (1972); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
The Existentialism of ltienne Gilson, 24 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 417 (1950). Cf. John T. Noonan,
Jr., Intoxicated by God, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999, § 7, at 9 (reviewing GARY WILLS, SAINT
AUGUSTINE); John T. Noonan, Jr., To Be Better, Think Harder, N.Y. TIMES, February 25,1990, §
7, at 28 (reviewing STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE).
7. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Renan's Life of Jesus: A Re-examination, 11 CATH. BIBLICAL Q.
26 (1949); John T. Noonan, Jr., Hegel and Strauss: The Dialectic and the Gospels, 12 CATH.
BIBLICAL Q 136 (1950); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Devious Employees, COMMONWEAL (1977);
John T. Noonan, Jr., No Room at Travelodge, COMMONWEAL (1978).
8. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Celibacy in the Fathers of the Church, in CELIBACY: THE
NECESSARY OPTION 138 (George H. Frein ed., 1968).
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and world Catholicism,9 general issues in canon law," and the
development of moral doctrine." Noonan's conclusions in these areas of
scholarly investigation have helped shape Catholic debate for the last
three decades."
As a Harvard-trained lawyer and federal judge, Noonan also has
authored a large number of works of more general interest to an
American legal audience. He has written important studies of legal and
judicial ethics, 3 judicial and legal biography, 4 the privilege against self-
9. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., MAGNA EST VERITAS: "GREAT IS TRUTH: IT PREVAILS"
(1986); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CATHOLIC IN THE UNITED STATES IN
THE YEAR 1991 (1991); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Community at Harvard, 59 NEW
OXFORD REV. 4 (March 1992); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Bishops and the Ruling Class: The
Moral Formation of Public Policy, in RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 138 (Frank T.
Birtel ed., 1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., Iff Were Pope; in IF I WERE THE POPE (Candida Lund ed.,
1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Moral Life of Catholics: Motionless, Declining, Improving, or
Merely Different, CATH. COMM'N ON INTELL. AND CULTURAL AFF. ANN. 14 (1982); John T.
Noonan, Jr., American Catholics and the Intellectual Life, 31 CROSS CURRENTS 433 (1981).
10. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Public Judgment in the Church, in JUDGMENT IN THE CHURCH
96 (William W. Bassett & Peter Huizing eds., 1977); John T. Noonan, Jr., Canon Law in the
United States: A Time of Fermen in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 61 (John N. Hazard & Wenceslas J. Wagner eds., 1970);
John T. Noonan, Jr., Human Rights and Canon Law, in RENt CASSIN AMICORUM
DISCiPULORUMQUE LIBER1V: I.THODOLOGIE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 105 (1972).
11. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
662 (1993 (studying the ways fundamental doctrines change over time); John T. Noonan, Jr., On
the Development of Doctrine, 180 AMERICA 6 (April 13,1999).
12 See ag., Richard A. McCormick's review of Contraception, in 114 AMERICA 174
(January 29, 1966) ("The ambition of this book... is simply staggering"). See also Peter M.
Huizing, 59 CATH. HIST. REV. 509 (1973) (reviewing Power to Dissolve); William W. Bassett, 32
JURIST 419 (1972) (reviewing Power to Dissolve).
13. See JOHN T. NOONAN JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (1997); JOHN T. NOONAN & KENNETH I. WINSTON, THE
RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS (1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., Choice of a
Profession, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 381 (1994); John T. Noonan, Jr., Other People's Morals: The
Lawyer's Conscience, 48 TENN. L. REV. 227 (1981); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966). Cf. JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (addressing the problem of the corrupt judge).
14. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDozO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYrHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976); John T. Noonan, Jr., Bias and
Biographers: A Tribute to Gerald Dunne, 34 ST. L U. L. REV. 725 (1990); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
Education, Intelligence, and Character in Judges, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1987); John T. Noonan,
Jr., The Catholic Justices of the United States Supreme Cour4 67 AM. CATH. HIST. REV. 369
(1981); John T. Noonan, Jr., Ordered Liberty: Cardozo and the Constitution, 1 CARDOZO L. REV.
259 (1979). Cf. John T. Noonan, Jr., Sitting in Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, § 7, at 7
(reviewing Andrew Kaufman's biography of Benjamin Cardozo); John T. Noonan, Jr., Master of
Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1994, § 7, at 7 (reviewing Gerald Gunther's biography of Learned
Hand).
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incrimination, 5 American slave law, 6 capital punishment, 7 abortion,8
the legal and moral dimensions of physician-assisted suicide, 9 the use of
the constitutional convention as a means of amending the Constitution,"
marriage and family law,21 the emergence and development of an anti-
bribery ethic,2' law reviews,23 legal philosophy, 2' the Judiciary Act of
15. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 41 VA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
16. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED
AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMs (1977).
17. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. L REV. 1011
(1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., Should State Executions Run on Time? N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1992,
A, at 17.
1& See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE
SEVENTIES (1979); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV.
668 (1984); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Akron Decision: A Pragmatic Politician's Parody of
Solomon, 9 HUM. LIFE REV. 5 (1983); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Hatch Amendment and the New
Federalism, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 93 (1982); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Experience of Pain
by the Unborn, 7 HUM. LIFE REV. 7 (1981); John T. Noonan, The Right of Abortion Funding, 7
HUM. LIFE REV. 52 (1981); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Supreme Court and Abortion: Upholding
Constitutional Principles, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (1980); John T. Noonan, Jr., The
Abortion Power, 5 HUM. LIFE REV. 16 (1979); John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion: The Case for a
Constitutional Amendment, 45 NEW OXFORD REV. 4 (1978); John T. Noonan, Jr., The American
Consensus on Abortion, 4 HUM. LIFE REV. 60 (1978); John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion in the
American Context, 3 HUM. LIFE REV. 29 (1977); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Constitutionality of the
Regulation of Abortion, 21 HASTINGS L. J. 51 (1969); John T. Noonan, Jr., Amendment of the
Abortion Law: Relevant Data and Judicial Opinion, 15 CATH. LAW. 124 (1969).
19. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Dealing with Death, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 387 (1998).
20. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BALANCED BUDGET. THE STATES CALL FOR A
CONVENTION (1982); John T. Noonan, Jr., Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment Its
Meaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L J. 641 (1979).
21. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L REV. 255
(1973); John T. Noonan, Jr., Sexual Freedom and the Three Functions of Law, in SEXUALITY: A
SEARCH FOR PERSPECTIVE 153 (Donald L. Grummon and Andrew M. Barclay, eds., 1971); John
T. Noonan, Jr., Freedom to Reproduce: Cautionary History, Present Invasions, Future Assurance,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (1970); John T. Noonan, Jr. and M.C. Dunlop,
Unintended Consequences: Laws Indirectly Affecting Population, in ASPECTS OF POPULATION
GROWrH POLICY (Robert Parke, Jr. & Charles F. Westoff, eds., 1972).
22. See NOONAN, BRIBES, supra note 13. See also John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribery, 2 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 741 (1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribery in John of Salisbury,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 197
(Peter Linehan ed., 1988); John T. Noonan, Jr., Agency, Bribery, and Redemption in Thomas
Aquinas, 49 RECHERCHES DE THfOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MtDItVALE 159 (1982); John T.
Noonan, Jr., Bribery and the Boycott The Responsibility of American Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1607
(1976).
23. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Law Reviews, 47 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1995).
24. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1768 (1998); John T.
Noonan, Jr., The Relation of Words to Power, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 13 (1996); John T. Noonan,
Jr., Cannibalism and the Common Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 749 (1984); John T. Noonan, Jr., The
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1789,2 and political affairs and theory. For example, his study of the
American Colonization Society, the organization responsible for the
settlement of Liberia in the years before the Civil War, reveals the
mixed motives of this association's founders.' Likewise, his
examination of the Magna Carta reveals the misapprehensions
regarding that document, under which generations of Anglo-American
lawyers have labored.2 More recently, Noonan has turned his attention
to problems arising from the relationship between religious believers
and the state, producing two books and a number of articles on the
subject.29 Furthermore, he has helped decide a number of important
Law as Teacher, 3 HUM. LIFE REV. 8 (1977); From Social Engineering to Creative Charity, in
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 179 (Walter J. Ong
ed., 1968); John T. Noonan, Jr., Value References in the Teaching of Negligence 8 J. LEGAL
EDUQ. 150 (1955). Cf. John T. Noonan, Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES May 25,
1986 § 7 at 12 (reviewing Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire).
25. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Judicial Impartiality and the Judiciary Act of 1789,14 NOVA L.
REV. 123 (1989).
26. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Catholicism and Liberalism, 126 COMMONWEAL (March 25,
1994); John T. Noonan, Jr., Reagan, Ronald in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1516 (Leonard W. Levy, et al. ed., 1986); John T. Noonan, Jr., Liberal Laxists, 6
HUM. LIFE REV. 32 (1980); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Protestant Philosophy of John Locke, in
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN HONOR OF THE VERY REVEREND IGNATIUS SMITH, O.P. 92 (John
K. Ryan ed., 1952).
27. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Selfish as well as the Disinterested Affections of the HearL
The Case of the American Colonization Society, in PHILANTHROPY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
109 (Jack Salzman ed., 1987).
28. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Curia Romana and the Story of Magna Cart, in
FORSCHUNGEN ZUR REICHS-, PAPST- UND LANDEGESCa-CHTE: PETER HERDE ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 291 (Karl Borchardt & Enno Bunz, eds., 1998).
29. See NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1; JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE (1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious Liberty at
the Stake, 84 VA. L REV. 459 (1998): John T. Noonan, Jr., The Heart of a Catholic Law School, 23
U. DAYTON L REV. 7 (1997); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Tensions and the Ideals: Religious
Hwnan Rights in the United States, 10 EMORY INT'LL REV. 183,(1996); John T. Noonan, Jr., The
Tensions and the Ideals, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECnIVES 593 (Johan D. Van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
The Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 642 (1995); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious
Law Schools and the First Amendment, 20 J. C. & U. L. 43 (1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., The End
of Free Exercise, 42 DE PAUL L. REV. 567 (1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037 (1992); John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be
Religious?, U. ILL. L. REV. 713 (1988); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Constitutional Protection of
Individual Rights: The Real Role of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. PIT. L. REV. 717 (1988); John T.
Noonan, Jr., 'Quota of Imps,' in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS
EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 171 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert
C. Vaughan eds., 1988); John T. Noonan, Jr., Principled or Pragmatic Foundations of Freedom of
Conscience?, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 203 (1987); John T. Noonan, The Oblique View, 14 ME. B.J. 69
(1999).
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cases, including Harris v. Vasquez,3° a California death penalty case, and
Compassion in Dying,31 an assisted suicide case.
Despite Noonan's wide range of interests, he has maintained an
essential unity in his scholarship. First, he has an underlying concern
with contextualizing the principles, rules, and doctrines that he is
analyzing. This is illustrated, for instance, in his treatment of
contraception issues: by locating the origins of St. Augustine's thoughts
on the goods of marriage in his early experiences with Manichean
dualism and his later polemic against that belief system, and by
explaining twelfth century Catholic teaching on contraception as part of
a polemic against Catharism, Noonan contextualizes the foundations of
the Church's prohibition of contraception.32  Similarly, Noonan's
concern for contextualization is evidenced by his examination of the
history of religious liberty: by identifying the factors that influenced
James Madison to break with a legal tradition that had sanctioned the
use of legal coercion against religious dissenters in colonial America,
Noonan contextualizes Madison's decision to champion religious
liberty.33
Closely related to Noonan's desire to contextualize is his desire to
particularize. Noonan understands the development of doctrine and
rules to take place historically, through the interaction of persons with
the larger tradition. As one commentator observed, "Noonan's
insistence upon situating moral concepts not only in rough social
context, but even more precisely within the lives of particular persons,
bespeaks an epistemological commitment to historical specificity which
surpasses even that of [Alasdair] MacIntyre."' 4 Noonan engages in
exact and detailed historical analysis precisely to explore the intricacy of
human the response to the demands of morality and law.35 In his
30. 943 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (1995), rev'd 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc), en banc decision rev'd, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
32. See NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION, supra note 2, at 107-39 (contextualizing Augustine)
and 171-99 (contextualizing Catharism).
33. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 59-91.
34. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices of the Past John T.
Noonan, Jr. on Love and Power in Human History, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 203,206 (1994-95). Cf.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
35. Indeed, Noonan argues that the use of case-law, when used educationally, must be
understood as part of an historical process: "[C]ases must be rooted in the historical process to
contribute to the moral education essential to the professional preparation of lawyers, who are to
be formed less as social engineers than as the charitable creators of value." NOONAN, PERSONS
AND MASKS, supra note 14, at xi.
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writings, humans are neither plaster saints nor monsters, but some
admixture of the two."
In less competent hands, a preoccupation with context and the
particular might collapse into a welter of disparate detail, lacking
organizational principle. Noonan, however, forestalls such collapse by
steadily keeping his focus on the unfolding over time of basic principles
of law and morality. In the case of usury, this involved the
abandonment of a literal understanding of Jesus's injunction "to lend
freely, expecting nothing in return." 37 In the case of slave law, what was
required was the recognition of the humanity of the person held in
bondage,' while in the case of bribery, an ideal of non-reciprocity in
public decision-making is seen to unfold gradually from the time of the
31Hebrew Bible to our own.
Noonan, however, does not see such an unfolding as a necessary
event. Happily missing from his work is even the intimation of some
Hegelian dialectical process invisibly shaping the development of human
morality and law. Rather, he finds much "backsliding" and occasionally
even the temporary abandonment of particular ideals.' Noonan's
argument, simply stated, is that the trajectory of human experience over
3,500 years of recorded history has favored the development of certain
moral principles and practices while rendering others non-functional or
even immoral.
The purpose of this Article is to examine Noonan's historiography of
religious liberty. He locates the basic ingredients of modern religious
liberty as far back as the Ten Commandments, although these elements
were not assembled into a coherent doctrine of religious freedom until
36. See Kaveny, supra note 34 at 208-09. Kaveny gives the example of Samuel Pepys,
the seventeenth century Englishman chiefly responsible for the building of the modem
British navy, and a central figure in Noonan's BRIBES, supra note 13. Pepys exploits his
position for sexual and monetary favors, but he is not caricatured:
Insisting that we recognize the ambiguity which characterized each human heart,
Noonan forestalls our initial instinct to recoil against Pepys and his corruptions as
repulsive, alien, and therefore irrelevant to us. Rather, we are absorbed by Pepys'
rationalizations and are led to wonder under what circumstances we ourselves might
have done the same thing.
Kaveny, supra note 34, at 208.
37. See Noonan, Development in Moral Doctrine, supra note 11, at 662-63.
38. See id. at 664-67.
39. See generally, NOONAN, BRIBES, supra note 13; see also Noonan, Bribery, supra note 22.
40. See, for example, Noonan's account of gift-giving and receiving in the days of St.
Columba's Ireland. See NOONAN, BRIBES, supra note 13, at 125-26.
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and not given full judicial
recognition by the United States Supreme Court until the middle of the
twentieth century. But Noonan does not simply trace in a straight line
the building up of the elements that have gone into making religious
liberty. Western conceptions of religious freedom have emerged from
debris of a thousand-year experiment in close church-state cooperation
especially with regard to the oppression of religious dissenters. Perhaps
in order to ward off any possibility of returning to the old ways, Noonan
constructs in meticulous detail the logic and experience of ecclesiastical
and secular interpenetration and religious persecution. Woven into this
narrative, one also finds a deep and subtle exploration of the various
ways the individual believer's conscience has been asserted and
suppressed in the course of Western history. Against this backdrop,
Noonan tells the story of the birth and adoption of the First
Amendment's commitment to religious liberty.
In building his historiography, Noonan presents a case for broad
recognition of religious liberty, culling both historical and theological
components. He contends that the drafting and adoption of the First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty must not be seen as the
triumph of a tolerant secular world view over an intolerant religious
one: James Madison-who was chiefly responsible for articulating the
ideals embodied in the First Amendment-was a religious believer who
sought to enshrine his peculiar religious insights in the Constitution of
the United States. Thus, Noonan maintains that the First Amendment's
protection of religious liberty was itself the product of theological
insight and reflection.
II. OLD-WORLD FOUNDATIONS
A. The Hebrew and Christian Scriptures
The Believer and Powers That Are4' begins auspiciously by quoting in
full the Ten Commandments.' Noonan singles out the importance of
the Ten Commandments in shaping belief in a law higher than the
state's, which could be used to criticize rulers who failed to live up to the
41. It must be stressed that Noonan has an expansive view of what ought to constitute a
casebook and legal education generally believing a sound education provides instruction in
"values," by which he means "the good, what is desirable." See Noonan, Value References, supra
note 24, at 150. A major part of Value References, in fact, is concerned with the evaluation of "the
presentation of values" in casebooks. Id. at 162. Much of what follows in Section II of this
Article is a study of the value references of Believer and the Powers That Are, supra note 29.
42. See NOONAN, THE BELIEvER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 3-5.
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high ideals embodied in these divinely uttered commands.43 He follows
this text with an excerpt from Deuteronomy stressing the impartiality of
God's judgment and the need to show mercy to the "orphan and the
widow,"" and he continues with the opening lines of the Book of
Isaiah.45 Isaiah in particular denounces the rulers of Judah as "rebels,
confederate with thieves... [who] do not give the orphan his rights, and
the widow's cause never comes before them."6 Noonan rounds his
excerpts from the Old Testament with the account of the Jewish woman
in the Book of Maccabees who lost seven sons to martyrdom on the
same day.47 Each of the sons had been ordered to eat pork by the Greek
king, and each refused." The last of the seven, although promised high
office if he would eat pork, likewise refused, declaring, "'I will not
submit to the king's command; I obey the command of the law given by
Moses to our ancestors.' ,
49
In choosing these passages for inclusion, Noonan has exercised a
clearly discernible principle of selection: the implications of each of
these passages for the future development of the principle of religious
liberty are stressed. Noonan does not emphasize that part of the Ten
Commandments which requires the People of Israel to worship the Lord
God alone and not to have strange gods before Him.' Nor does he
select for consideration passages that were interpreted by later Christian
exegetes as authority for religious persecution. There is no mention of
43. See id. at 4. Near the beginning of the religious traditions that were most to influence
America, the commandments recognized a Lawgiver above the nation, law based on God's will,
and a sanction that depended on obedience to Him. Life, property, truth, marriage, and worship
of God were given special status by the Ten Commandments. Permanent criteria for judging
human enterprises, including governments, came into written existence.
44. Id. at 5 (quoting Deut. 10:12-19).
45. See Id. at 6-7 (quoting Isaiah 1:1-23).
46. Id. at 7 (Isaiah 1:23). Isaiah continues to serve as inspiration for radical criticisms of the
state. See DANIELBERRIGAN, ISAIAH: SPIR1T OF COURAGE, GIFrOFTEARS (1996).
47. See id. at 7-8 (2 Maccabees 7:20-31).
48. See hi at 7.
49. Id at 8 (2 Maccabees 7:30).
50. See MOsHE WEINFELD, THE ANCHOR BIBLE: DEUTERONOMY 1-11 (1991) 284-93
(detailing the prohibition on the worship of strange gods). Cf. Exodus 20:23 ("gods of silver you
shall not make for yourself"); Exodus 23:24 (you shall not bow down [to their gods] or serve
them"); Leviticus 19:4 ("[molten gods] you shall not make for yourselves"); Leviticus 26:1 ("you
shall not make idols for yourselves"). Moshe Greenberg writes: "[Flollowing Philo, Josephus,
and Rabbi Ishmael... the First Commandment should be defined as the imperative to recognize
the LORD as the sole God.... " See Moshe Greenberg, The Decalogue Tradition Critically
Examined, in THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN HISTORY AND TRADTON 83, 99 (Ben-Zion Segal
& Gershon Levi eds., 1985).
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Elijah's massacre of the false prophets in the Book of Kings.1 Indeed,
there is a pronounced emphasis on passages-as in the excerpts from
Isaiah and Maccabees-that stress fidelity to principle over loyalty to the
state. What is thus being presented is a theological argument that
locates, at the very commencement of the Judeo-Christian tradition,
grounds for religious liberty.52
A similar process of selection can be discerned in the New
Testament passages Noonan singles out for inclusion. The texts
included are among the classical citations. Noonan begins with Romans
13:1-8, 53 a text that "became perhaps the most influential part of the
New Testament on the level of world history.""4 In this passage, Paul
asserts that believers should be subject to their rulers, because "there is
no power except by God."55  This excerpt is followed by Jesus's
admonition, as recorded in Mark, that "[w]hat are Caesar's give back to
Caesar and what are God's to God,"-6 Peter's response to the
Sanhedrin's prohibition on teaching in Jesus's name that "[w]e must
obey God rather than man, '57 and Jesus's declaration to Pontius Pilate
that "[m]y kingdom is not of this world."'
But again, what is omitted is another set of classical references used
by the authorities of the patristic age and the high and late middle ages
to justify the suppression of dissenting belief. The classic text used by
Augustine 9 and Thomas Aquinas,6 among others, the "compelle
51. See 1 Kings 18:40-4. Cf. St. Augustine, Letter 44 (to Eleusis and others), in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE (Henry Paolucci ed., 1962) (using this text to justify
religious persecution).
52. In later work, Noonan asserts that what was created by these texts was "[a] split of
authority." See LusTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 43. He continues: "The split
provided space in which liberty of conscience appeared." Id. While Hebrew did not have a word
for conscience, it did have the concept. lId Christianity would subsequently synthesize this
Hebrew background with the Stoic notion of conscience as "an inner judge," witness to the truth
and "voice of God." Id at 44.
53. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 9.
54. Ernst Banmel, Romans 13, in JESUS AND THE POLITICS OF HIS DAY 365, 365 (Ernst
Bammel and C.F.D. Moule eds., 1984).
55. Romans 13:1.
56. Mark 12:17 (quoted in NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra
note 29, at 9).
57. Acts 5:29 (quoted in NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra
note 29, at 10).
58. John 18:36 (quoted in Noonan, NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE, supra note 29, at 10).
59. See EMiLIEN LAMIRANDE, CHURCH, STATE, AND TOLERATION: AN INTRIGUING
CHANGE OF MIND IN AUGUSTINE (1975) at 51-58; see infra notes 65-66.
60. See Aquinas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 10, art. 8.
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intrare" passage in the Gospel of Luke,' goes unmentioned, as do other
frequently cited texts.' Again, Noonan identifies and stresses elements
that might be constructed into a theology of religious liberty.'
B. St. Augustine
St. Augustine (354-430), prolific theologian and bishop of the North
African community of Hippo," wrote frequently on the relationship of
church and state during his career." He wrote not as a disinterested
academic, but as a participant in affairs, actively seeking to prevail in the
rough-and-tumble political world of the early fifth century." Augustine
waged a steady battle with dissenters from the Catholic faith throughout
his career, particularly the Donatists and the Pelagians.6" His views
61. Luke 14:21-24 ("And the lord said unto the servant, 'Go out unto the highways and the
hedges, and compel them to come in [compelle intrare] that my house may be filled. For I say
unto you, that none of those men which were bidden shall taste of my banquet.")
62. See e.g., Titus 3:10-11 ("A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition,
avoid: knowing that he, that is such a one, is subverted.")
63. Noonan states:
By the first century A.D. there is in the Mediterranean world a religion, which will
spread widely in the West, that carries the concepts of a God, living, distinct from
and superior to any human being, society, or state; of obligations to that God,
distinct from and superior to any society or state; of authorized teachers who can
voice these obligations and judge any society or state; of an inner voice of reason
that is one way God speaks as well as by His authorized teachers. According to
these concepts as taught by this religion, each person, individually and not as part of
a family, tribe, or nation, will have to account to God as Judge for every thought and
deed. Collectively, these concepts are at the core of liberty of conscience and liberty
of religion.
NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 44-45.
64. On Augustine's life, see PETER BROWN, AUGUSTINE OFHIPPO: A BIOGRAPHY (1967).
65. On Augustine's views of church and state, see HERBERT A. DEANE, THE POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE (1963) at 172-220; ROBERT MARKUS, SAECULUM:
HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE 133-53 (1970). Cf. Peter Brown,
St Augustine's Attitude To Religious Coercion, 54 J. ROMAN STUDIES 107 (1964), reprinted in
PETER BROWN, RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 260-78 (1972).
66. See BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, supra note 64, at 226-30.
67. The Donatists had their origin in the fourth century, in the wake of the last great
persecutions, as a sort of purifying movement, suspicious of permitting back into the fold those
Christians who had compromised or "lapsed" during time of persecution. They remained a
powerful dissenting voice in the North African church through the fifth century. See W.H.C.
FREND, THE DONATIST CHURCH: A MOVEMENT OF PROTEST IN ROMAN NORTH AFRICA
(1952); Cf. JOHN ANTHONY CORCORAN, AUGUSTINUS CONTRA DONATISTAS (1997) (detailing
Augustine's campaign against the Donatists). Pelagius was a British layman who challenged
traditional teaching on original sin and took an optimistic view of human nature. See PAUL
JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 117-22 (1976).
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changed with time, and the historian who wishes to understand his work
must accept an inevitable dynamism, and sometimes even evident
contradiction, between the younger and older Augustine. 6
Noonan selects for inclusion excerpts from four of Augustine's
letters.69 These letters reflect both the complexity of Augustine's
thought and the general trajectory it followed from a more tolerant
position to one supporting the active coercion of religious dissenters.
But, they also reflect Augustine's position on the proper behavior of
Christian office-holders in the new Christianizing Roman Empire. For
Noonan, the relationship of the believer to the powers that are is a two-
way street: believers might sometimes be oppressed by state power, but
now, as the Roman Empire christianizes, they also may need guidance
in its proper exercise.
Letter 133 to Marcellinus deals with the punishments to be meted
out to some Donatist radicals who had attacked and mutilated members
of the Catholic clergy.70 Augustine advises Marcellinus not to show the
radicals the full harshness of the law.71 The duty of the Christian judge is
to "fulfill the office of a father. Be angry at wickedness in such a way
that you take care to remember humanity."' Augustine is not above
invoking the authority of his office to ensure that Marcellinus show the
requisite gentleness: "If you do not hear a friend asking, hear a bishop
68. Peter Brown, indeed, cautions that Augustine's thought is simply too fluid and
responsive to circumstances to be summarized in terms of a "doctrine" of church and state. See
generally Brown, St Augustine's Attitude, supra note 65. Rather, Brown wishes to speak of
Augustine's "attitude," a term which captures both the flexibility in Augustine's thought on
church and state but also its deep foundations in his views on necessity and free will and the
prophetic nature of the Old Testament. See id
69. These include Letters 133 and 138, both to Marcellinus, a representative of the emperor
in attendance at a conference of Donatist and Catholic bishops held at Carthage in 411; Letter
153, to Macedonius, governor of Africa, written in 414; and Letter 185, written to a second
governor of Africa, Boniface, on the coercion of the Donatists.
70. See Letter 133, translated and excerpted in NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 12-13.
71.
I have been filled with the greatest worry that Your Highness judge that they be
struck with such severity of law that they suffer the kind of things that they have
done. By this letter I beg the faith which you have in Christ that, through the mercy
of Christ the Lord, you do not do this nor permit it to be done under any
circumstances.
Id. at 13.
72. Id
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advising. ''
Letter 138, also to Marcellinus, expands upon themes struck in the
earlier letter. Marcellinus, a sincere Christian, asked Augustine to help
him reconcile the seemingly extreme demands of Christianity-"to him
who strikes us we must offer the other cheek and give our coat to him
who takes our shirt, and walk twice as far with him who makes us go"-
with the demands of statecraft. 74 Augustine first responds by pointing
out to Marcellinus that not even the authors of Scripture intended these
sayings to be taken in their total literalness: when Jesus's interrogators
struck him, he did not offer them his other cheek, but asked why they
struck him.' What is important to Augustine about these admonitions
is the role they should play in shaping our interior dispositions.' Again,
Jesus's example is instructive: while he did not offer the other cheek, he
ultimately forgave those who persecuted him.' With the proper inward
disposition, Augustine continues, it is even permissible for Christians to
wage war."
The third letter Noonan excerpts, Letter 153 to Macedonius, also
considers the duties of a Christian judge. Again we find Augustine
exercising his teaching role, appealing to the conscience of a Christian
governor to show mercy in meting out punishment to criminals.
Augustine's fear is that Macedonius might fail to give the condemned
the opportunity to repent before execution. Augustine assures
Macedonius that he is "compelled by charity for humankind to intercede
73. Id. Augustine continues: "Since I speak to a Christian, especially on such a matter, I
shall say without arrogance: it is appropriate for you to hear a bishop commanding, Excellent and
Deservedly Distinguished Lord and Very Dear Son." Id.
74. Id. at 14.
75. See id. at 15.
76. See id.
Finally, these commandments relate more to the preparation of the heart, which is
within, than to the deed which is done openly.... These commandments of patience
are therefore always to be kept in the heart, and benevolence is to be fulfilled in the
will, so that evil is not returned for evil. But many things are to be done with those
who are unwilling, beating them with a certain kindly severity and taking into
account not their will but what is useful for them.
Id.
77. See id.
78. See Id. at 15-16. Cf. LOUIS SwIFr, THE EARLY FATHERS ON WAR AND MILITARY
SERVICE 110-49 (1983); Louis Swift, Search the Scriptures: Patristic Exegesis and the Ius Belli, in
PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IN PERSPECTIVE 48, 59-68
(Charles J. Reid Jr. ed., 1986); David Lenihan, The Just War Theory in the Work of Saint
Augustine, 19 AUGUSTINIAN STUD. 37 (1988).
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for the guilty, so that they do not so finish this life by punishment that
when it is finished they cannot finish the punishment."79 Augustine also
stresses that he is moved to act out of affirmative religious
commandment. 8'
Finally, in the fourth excerpt, Noonan arrives at Augustine's
arguments for the coercion of religious dissenters. 8' The emperors had
now converted to Christianity. The time was ripe to bring to bear state
power on behalf of religious orthodoxy.2 In this context, Augustine
analogizes the position of the heretic to that of an adulterer: they have
both broken faith, but the heretic has committed the more serious act:
"Why, since free will has been divinely given to man, are adulteries
punished by the laws and sacrileges permitted? Is it a lighter matter for
a soul not to keep faith in God than for a woman not to keep it with her
husband?"" Compulsion, Augustine argues, has been proven by
experience to work.84 Indeed, the Apostle Paul was only converted
because Christ brought force to bear against him on the road to
79. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 17.
Augustine's point is that if the guilty show sufficient repentance before being put to death, they
may not be compelled to undergo further punishment in the world to come.
80. See id.
Do not doubt that this my duty arises from religion. God "with whom there is no
iniquity," whose power is supreme, who Sees not only how each one is but also how
each one will be, who alone cannot slip in judging because He cannot be deceived in
judging, nevertheless as the Gospel says, "makes his sun rise upon the good and the
bad, and rains upon the just and the unjust." Of His wonderful goodness, I am an
imitator.
Id at 17.
81. See Letter 185, translated and excerpted in NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 19-20.
82. See id.
Those who refuse to have just laws enacted against their impieties say that the
Apostles did not seek such things from the kings of the earth. They do not consider
that the time then was something else and that all things are done at their own times.
Then there was no emperor who believed in Christ, no emperor who would serve
Him by passing laws in favor of religion and against impiety .... Not yet was time
was to which the psalm says, "And now, kings, understand: learn you who judge the
earth, serve the Lord in fear and rejoice in Him with fear."
Id at 19.
83. Id.
84. See Noonan, Principled or Pragmatic Foundations?, supra note 29, at 204.
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Damascus.8s Augustine thus concludes:
Hence the Lord Himself first commands the guests to be
brought to his great wedding feast, but afterward has them
compelled; for when the slaves cried, Lord it is done as you
command, he said, Go out into the highways and hedges and
whomever you find compel them to enter .... Therefore if the
power which the Church has received by divine gift through
religion and faith in the time of kings is exercised as it should
be, those who are found in the highways and hedges that is, in
heresies and schisms are compelled to come in.'
What is seen by the close of this set of excerpts is a treatment of
"church and state" markedly different than the standard textbooks. In
arranging these selections, Noonan shows less concern for those matters
that textbook writers have traditionally focused on-institutional
arrangements or the proper allocation of power between Pope and the
secular power--than for defining the sorts of claims the religious
conscience can make upon the state. Augustine, as a Christian bishop,
may properly call upon a Christian office-holder to bring to bear
85. See id. at 20.
86. Id. Noonan observes, concerning this letter "The letter reflects a distinct evolution in
Augustine's thought. The Donatists are to be driven into the Church by force. He still retains the
notion of mild force expressed in the letter... to Marcellinus." See supra notes 71-72, and
accompanying text. "He still harbors the view, also expressed to Marcellinus, that the infliction of
moderate punishment can be paternal and medicinal." See supra notes 71-72, and accompanying
text.
Scourging is not execution. But embracing in principle the use of coercion against
schismatics and heretics, he lays a general foundation for religious persecution.
True, the death penalty would run counter to his rationale as well as to his repeated
pleas for mercy; but it was to prove impossible to draw his nice line between the
severe and lenient infliction of pain.
Id. at 19.
87. See eg. HUGO RAHNER, CHURCH AND STATE IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY 39-183 (Leo
Donald Davis, trans., 1992) (discussing and quoting extensively from documents establishing the
institutional arrangements of church and state in the fourth and fifth centuries); PAGANISM AND
CHRIsTIANITY, 100-425 C.E. 261-89 (Ramsay MacMullen & Eugene N. Lane, eds., 1992)
(reviewing power-sharing arrangements between Christians and pagans and the issue of forced
conversions); CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 23-41 (Bennett D. Hill ed., 1970)
(considering the political implications of St. Augustine's City of God); see generally THE EARLY
CHURCH AND THE STATE (Agnes Cunningham ed., 1982) (reviewing and excerpting from the
writings of leading theologians on the allocation of institutional authority between church and
state).
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Christian principles in deciding cases. The religious office-holder may
properly shape his or her inner disposition by reference to Christian
love. Noonan's editorial judgment is here sharply focused on the subject
of his book's title, the relationship of the believer and governmental
power. But these excerpts also make clear that certain boundaries
should not be crossed. Augustine's argument in favor of compelling the
Donatists back into the fold subsequently "provides the charter of the
Inquisition" and furnishes a license to 1,000 years of religious
persecution." Eventually, the experience of persecution and reflection
upon the mandates of Scripture would demonstrate the error behind this
justification,' but not until much blood was shed.
C. Prelates, Princes, and Persecution: Christendom, 1160-1555
The fifth-century collapse of Roman secular authority in the
Western Empire caused the whole relationship of institutional
Christianity and secular authority to fundamentally change, Within
central Italy, the papacy came to assume secular powers simply in order
to "fill[] a vacuum of power."' 9  The papacy shouldered the
responsibility of converting the Germanic tribes that had moved into
Western Europe, and eventually, in the eighth century, struck an
alliance with the Franks, the most powerful of the tribal kingdoms that
emerged from the wreckage of the old empire.9" In turn, the collapse of
the Frankish kingdom in the ninth century subjected the church in many
parts of Europe to the rule of local kings and warlords who treated
ecclesiastical grounds and goods as so much personal property.
However, bishops and other ecclesiastical leaders also were forced to
assume a wide variety of traditional secular responsibilities throughout
many parts of Europe.93  Indeed, in light of this co-mingling of
88. NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 19.
89. See infra notes 154-171,219-248 and accompanying text.
90. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-300,16 (1964).
91. See id at 16-19.
92. See id at 24.
93. See E.N. JOHNSON, THE SECULAR ACrIVITIES OF THE GERMAN EPISCOPATE 919-
1024 (1932). Under separate headings, Johnson discusses bishops as guardians of the frontier,
civil servants, soldiers and builders, and economic administrators. See id. The German
episcopate continued to exercise significant military responsibilities in the twelfth century and was
the subject of satire questioning whether a German bishop could ever achieve salvation. See
Timothy Reuter, Episcopi cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era, in
WARRIORS AND CHURCHMEN IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO KARL
LEYSER 79-80 (Timothy Reuter ed., 1992) The canon law prohibition on participating in
judgments of blood also prohibited clerical participation in warfare. See infra notes 116-19.
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responsibilities, kings came to appoint bishops and entrust them with
the symbols of their ecclesiastical office.'
In the closing years of the eleventh century, under the impetus of an
ecclesiastical reform movement, this arrangement blew apart in what
has become known as "the papal revolution."9' The battle cry of the
revolutionary party became libertas ecclesiae-"the liberty of the
Church" ---although, in practice, the more extreme among them sought
to exalt the spiritual authority of the church above the temporal
authority of merely secular powers.w In fact, however, neither side
could prevail completely,' and of necessity, a whole series of
compromises were struck apportioning authority between "church" and
"state."99 It is in the aftermath of these compromises, in the twelfth
94. See TIERNEY, CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 90 at 24-25.
95. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 85-113 (1983).
96. Id. at 94.
97. See id. at 94-99 (discussing the claims of Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), leader of the
papal revolution). The proper relation of the spiritual and the temporal power remains the
central defining question of medieval political history from the eleventh century to the
Reformation.
98. See Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 17, 24 (Johan D. van der Vyver &
John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
99. Brian Tierney has observed: "Because neither side could make good its more
extreme claims, a dualism of church and state persisted in medieval society and eventually
was rationalized in many works of political theory." Id. at 24. Efforts to reach a modus
vivendi are also evident in many areas of private law. To take England as an example, Crown
and Church each had exclusive competences, the Crown over such matters as feudal property
transactions among laypersons, and the Church over matters like marriage and domestic
relations law. See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 255-
282 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the the English law of feudal relations); RICHARD H.
HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1974) (discussing
ecclesiastical competence over marriage); Richard H. Helmholz, Infanticide in the Province of
Canterbury During the Fifteenth Century, 2 HIST. OF CHILDHOOD Q. 379 (1975) (treating
ecclesiastical competence over infanticide); Richard H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church
Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius.- A Reassessment of the Common Law, 10 VA. L. REV.
431 (1977) (discussing the role of ecclesiastical courts in ordering child support in bastardy
proceedings). In some instances, such as informal contracts and violations of the usury
prohibition, royal and ecclesiastical jurisdiction overlapped. See Richard H. Helmholz,
Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 L.Q. REv. 406 (1976); Richard H. Helmholz, Usury and the
Medieval English Church Courts, 61 SPECULUM 364 (1986). Writs of prohibition were
available from the king where jurisdictional boundaries had been transgressed, although the
Church also had procedural devices by which it might retain technically prohibitable actions.
See Richard H. Helmholz, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian Before 1500, 43
MEDIAEVAL STUD. 297 (1981); Richard H. Helmholz, Writs of Prohibition and Ecclesiastical
Sanction in the English Courts Christian, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1011 (1976). Cf. Norma Adams,
The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian, 20 MINN. L. REV. 272 (1936); G.B. Flahiff, The
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century England of Henry II and Thomas Becket, that Noonan takes up
again the thread of his story.
1. Interpenetration
"Interpenetration" is the term David Knowles used to describe the
relationship of Church and Crown in twelfth-century England,'o and it is
one Noonan borrows to tell the story of the relationship between these
two powers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.' Noonan offers two
complementary vantage points. He begins, conventionally enough, by
looking at power-sharing arrangements in the twelfth and thirteenth
century worlds. Using England as his case study, Noonan opens with
excerpts illustrating the struggle between Henry II and Thomas
Becket,' 02 followed by selections pertaining to the drafting of Magna
Carta and its ultimate repudiation by Pope Innocent III.13 In providing
these selections, Noonan makes the important point that it is
anachronistic to speak of a "Church versus State" conflict." Henry II
and King John were both Christians who took oaths upon coronation to
work for the Church of God and the whole Christian people.' 5 But in
the context of twelfth- and thirteenth-century power relations, they were
unafraid to risk ecclesiastical censure to defend royal rights. Both
Henry and John were opposed as well as assisted in their efforts by
ecclesiastical officials. '°6  The interpenetration was indeed
Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century, Part 1, 6 MEDIAEVAL
STUDIES 261 (1944); G.B. Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth
Century, Part 11, 7 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 219 (1945).
100. DAVID KNOWLES, THOMAS BECKET 59 (1976).
101. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 21.
102. See id at 22-27.
103. See id. at 27-31.
104. Id at 27.
105. Bracton's Treatise states that the king was required to swear
First, that he will command, and as his strength allows work, that for the Church of
God and for the whole Christian people true peace be observed in all his time.
Second, that he will prevent rapacity and all wickedness to men of every degree.
Third, that in all judgments he will command equity and mercy, so that a clement
and merciful God may grant him mercy and by his justice all may enjoy a firm peace.
Id at 35.
106. Henry's chief opponent was, of course, Becket. See id. at 22-27. Early in John's
reign, he and Pope Innocent III locked horns over filling the vacant See at Canterbury, with
Innocent finally prevailing with the selection of Stephen Langton. See id. at 28. After his
installation, Langton continued to take a hard line against the King, and was one of the
leading forces behind the drafting of Magna Carta: "On June 15, 1215, the bishops of
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"thoroughgoing." 107
But again, Noonan also offers a less conventional vantage point by
supplying a series of excerpts from Bracton's treatise, On the Laws and
Customs of England (De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae).1" The
authors, William Ralegh and, to a lesser extent, Ralegh's clerk, Henri de
Bratton, were clerics as well as royal judges and their work was
saturated with religious imagery."° In the excerpts Noonan provides,
Ralegh and Bratton assert that the ultimate sanction of the unjust judge
is divine retribution of the most fearful sort.1 The king himself, the
treatise continues, "ought to be under no man but under God and under
the law; for the law makes the king."' 1 Furthermore, "Because [the
king] ought to be under the law since he is the vicar of God, he is clearly
close to the likeness of Jesus Christ, whose vice-regent he is on earth."
112
Judges themselves-because they exercise a divine office-are not to
receive gifts from litigants lest they become "corrupted by
defilements." 1
3
England, led by Langton, a party of barons, and the papal legate Pandulf secured John's
consent at Runnymeade to the document that was to be celebrated as 'The Great Charter."'
Id. However, John outmaneuvered the proponents of the Charter. See id. He had previously
taken the step of conveying England to the Pope and received it back to be governed as a
papal fief. See id. John then appealed to the Pope to invalidate the Charter as a violation of
both royal and ecclesial rights. See id. The Pope obliged, declaring the Charter invalid by
reason of force and fear. See icL at 30-31. John's successor, Henry III, ultimately
promulgated the Charter after Innocent's death. See id. at 29.
107. KNOWLES, supra note 100, at 59.
108. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 31-35.
Cf. HENRY DE BRACrON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thome
trans., 1968).
109. William Ralegh, the principal author of Bracton's treatise, served as the law clerk of
the royal judge Martin de Pateshull. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE, supra note 29, at 32. Ralegh became a royal judge in 1234 and, in a further manifestation of
interpenetration, was subsequently elected Bishop of Winchester. See id The treatise passed
upon William's death to Henri de Bratton, Ralegh's young assistant, who himself made only a few
changes in the text. See id De Bratton became royal judge in 1245 and died in 1268. See id. De
Bratton's heirs subsequently circulated the text, and the work was misattributed to him when it
was printed in 1569. See id
110. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 33-34.
111. Id at34.
llz Id
113. Id at 35. Regarding the divine nature of the judicial office and the avoidance of gift-
taking judges must observe, Ralegh and de Bratton state:
It is said: "Look at what you do, for you do not exercise the judgment of man but of
God, and that which you judge shall redound upon you. Let the fear of the Lord be
with you and do everything with care. For with our Lord God there is no
wickedness nor taking up of persons nor desire for offerings which blind the eyes of
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But while Ralegh and Bratton read into English law theological
principles and canonistic doctrines, they also "tacitly ignored areas
where canon law clashed with English custom," especially the subject of
clerical participation in the death penalty."4 The Fourth Lateran
Council forbade clerics from pronouncing or executing a capital
sentence, or even from being present when such punishment was carried
out.115  "Ralegh, like many other bishops, enacted the prohibition in
legislation for his own diocese of Norwich."'1 6 Although Ralegh and
Bratton assuredly knew of the prohibition, as royal judges they must
have been required "to pronounce it many times."1 7 Perhaps uneasy
with their dual responsibilities, Ralegh and Bratton omitted from their
treatise mention of this canonical prohibition.
118
In these selections one sees interpenetration to the point of
permeation; one sees the deep debt that contemporary Anglo-American
law owes its canonistic roots. Magna Carta itself was influenced by
ecclesiastical participation in its drafting."9 Bracton's treatise, famous
for its declaration that the king is under God and the law,' is seen to be
part of an intellectual universe steeped in religious belief and theological
reasoning. Again, however, Noonan does not let go of his subject
without considering-obliquely in this instance-the believing office
the wise and twist the words of the just," as is read in Ecclesiasticus, Chapter 20:
"Courtesy-presents and gifts blind the eyes of judges."
He who said gifts or offerings meant every kind of offering: (1) an offering from the
hand-that sort of thing is something corporeal that is offered; (2) an offering from
the tongue, which is a flattering and fawning petition, a public proclamation of
praise, a symphony celebrating vain glory; (3) an offering from obedience, which is
service bestowed and received in return for which the straightness of judgment is
twisted.
Idt at 34.
114. Id. at 32.
115. See Fourth Lateran Council, c. 18, in DECREES OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS I at
244 (Norman P. Tanner ed., 1990).
116. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE supra note 29, at 33.
117. Id
118. See id
119. See id at 27-31. For further analysis of canon-law influence on Magna Carta, see R.H.
Helmholz, Magna Carta and the lus.Commune, 66 U. CHI. L REV. 297 (1999); NOONAN, Curia
Romana, supra note 28; Brian Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 163 (1987).
120. Bracton's recognition of the king's subjection to God and law has been cited in leading
constitutional cases into the middle of this century. See eg. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,655 n. 27 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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holder's conscience: Ralegh and Bratton were royal as well as
ecclesiastical officials who, as part of their royal duties, imposed the
sentence of death on miscreants although in so acting they violated the
mandates of canon law. Relieving themselves of the tension of
inconsistency, they banished from their treatise on English law mention
of their responsibility at canon law to avoid judgments of blood.
2. The Logic of Persecution
In the closing years of the twelfth century, after some brief
experimentation in dealing with heretics "charitably, '1' the church
began to construct a set of legal mechanisms to enforce orthodoxy in its
ranks.'2 In succeeding decades, these mechanisms were considerably
refined. Ecclesiastical officials were empowered to investigate charges
of heresy, and were to turn over to the secular arm for execution
heretics found to have relapsed." Theologians, philosophers, and
lawyers all offered justifications for the new system. 4
Noonan singles out Thomas Aquinas for the lucidity of his work."
Aquinas, who was the most influential of the medieval schoolmen," was
also known as the "Angelic Doctor." But, Noonan notes, Aquinas's
teaching "on religion and governmental power is far from angelic."' '
Aquinas was a forceful exponent of the alliance between church and
state for the enforcement of orthodoxy. Central to Aquinas's thought is
the idea of heresy as a breach of faith. Noonan observes:
[Fides-faith--is the central value Aquinas is defending ....
Modern translators translate fides in a feudal relation as fealty.
121. See EDWARD PETERS, ERESY AND AUTHORITY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 165-66
(1980) (describing the way of caritas).
122. In the decree Sicut ait beatus Leo, the Third Lateran Council pronounced anathema on
a number of heretical movements. See Decrees Of The Ecumenical Councils, supra note 115 at
224-25. The decree Ad abolendam, issued by Pope Lucius III in 1184, authorized Catholic princes
to wage war on a variety of named heretical movements. See X. 5.7.9. An English translation of
this document is found in Peters, supra note 121 at 170-73.
123. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 45.
124. See ALBERT C. SHANNON, THE MEDIEVAL INQUISITION at 48-72 (2d ed., 1991);
BERNARD HAMILTON, THE MEDIEVAL INQUISITION 31-39 (1981).
125. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 36.
126. Demonstrating Aquinas's continuing influence, Noonan notes that the 1917 Code of
Canon Law "prescribed that all priests were to be educated 'according to the method, doctrine,
and principles of the Angelic Doctor.'" See id. at 37. Cf. CODE OF CANON LAW, ch. 1366, sec. 2
(1917).
127. Id. at36.
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
They translate fides in marriage as fidelity. They translate fides
in religion as belief. They lose the triple tie that binds the
analogues of the concept together. Aquinas is for keeping faith
to an overlord, faith to a spouse, faith in God. The same
principle that justifies the Church in making the married or
members of a religious order keep their vows justifies making
those who have accepted the faith keep it. The infidelis-the
infidel, the unfaithful-is to be forced back into the fold."
Aquinas's logical exposition of the necessity of compulsion is
inexorable. He begins expansively by asking: "are infidels to be forced
to the Faith?"'29 Good scriptural authority is cited for the proposition
that "infidels are in no way to be forced to the faith."'' However,
Augustine's exegesis of compelle intrare overcomes contrary texts as
Aquinas concludes that "some are to be forced to the faith. "' 3
Aquinas goes on to discuss the offenses of "heresy, a sin committed
by those 'professing the faith of Christ,' and 'apostasy,' a sin committed
by one 'withdrawing from the faith."' As with infidelity generally,
Aquinas musters with heresy scriptural texts that could have supported
a policy of tolerance. 3 Again, however, Aquinas rejects these passages
128. lt
129. Summa Theologiae, Secunda secundae, q. 10, art. 8 (translated in NOONAN, THE
BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29 at 37).
130. Id. Aquinas cites Matthew 13:28 (noting Jesus's instruction not to gather the tares lest
in doing so the wheat is torn up), and the statement in the Book of Ezekiel 18:23 that God does
not will the deaths of sinners. See id. at 38.
131. It at 37. Aquinas distinguishes broadly between two types of inftdeles, those who have
never received the faith and those who have broken with the faith. See id. Only those who have
broken with the faith are to be compelled to return. See id. Regarding the treatment those who
have not received the faith should receive, Aquinas states:
It must be said that some infidels have not received the faith, such as the gentiles
and the Jews; and such are in no way to be forced to the faith so that they believe,
because to believe depends on the will. They are nonetheless to be forced by the
faithful, if they can, not to impede the faith by blasphemies or evil presuasions or
open peresecutions. And on this account the faithful of Christ frequently wage war
against infidels, not to force them to believe.., but on this account, to force them
not to impede the faith of Christ.
Id. at 38. Regarding those infidels who have broken with the faith, Aquinas states: "But there are
other infidels who once received the faith and professed it, such as heretics and every apostate;
and such are to be forced physically to hold to what they once received." Id.
132. Summa theologiae, Secunda secundae, Q. 11, art. 1 (quoted in NOONAN, THE
BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 410).
133. Aquinas cites 2 Timothy 2:24 ("The servant of God must be mild, correcting with
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in favor of a reading of Scripture that favors persecution of heretics."
Heretics, Aquinas argues, are like counterfeiters who break faith and
corrupt the currency by which temporal life is conducted."5 If the prince
may execute counterfeiters, how much more may he put to death one
who corrupts immortal souls?.. Relapsed heretics especially deserve
execution:
If returning heretics were always received so as to be preserved
in their lives and other temporal goods, this could be to the
prejudice of the solution of others; both because if they relapsed
again they would infect others, and because if they escaped
without punishment, others would more securely lapse again
into heresy .... '
Finally, apostates are subject to excommunication, and apostate princes
are not to be obeyed by their subjects."
One might object to Aquinas's line of reasoning: heretics and
apostates clearly took their stances by reason of conscience. Does
conscience offer any independent foundation for religious liberty? It
modesty those who resist the truth so that God may grant them repentance and they will know
the truth and escape the snares of the devil."); 1 Corinthians 11:19 (asserting that because Paul
declares heresies necessary in order to know truth, the Church might be obliged to tolerate
heresies as something necessary to ecclesial life). At Summa theologiae, Secunda Secundae, q. 2,
art. 11, Aquinas considers and accepts a pragmatic foundation for the tolerance of heretics in
circumstances where their forcible suppression could lead to greater evils:
But the rites of other infidels, which bear nothing true or useful, are not to be
tolerated.., except perhaps to avoid some evil, to wit, scandal or a division that
could arise from this or an obstacle to the salvation of those who would gradually be
converted to the faith if they were tolerated. On this account, the Church has
sometimes tolerated the rites of even heretics and pagans when there was a great
multitude of infidels.
See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 39. Noonan
elsewhere observes that this teaching provided the Catholic Church with a pragmatic foundation
for religious toleration from the sixteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. See Noonan,
Principled or Pragmatic Foundations?, supra note 29, at 206.
134. Decisive for Aquinas is Titus 3:10: "After the first and second correction, avoid the
heretical man. You know that one of this sort is perverted." NOONAN, BELIEVER AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29 at 39 (quoting Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 11,
art. 3).
135. See NOONAN, BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 40.
136. See id.
137. Id,
138. Id. at 41.
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would seem so. While commenting upon a decree of Pope Innocent
III, '39 the canon lawyer Bernard of Parma-author of the influential
ordinary gloss to the Decretals of Gregory IX-taught that "no one
ought to act against one's conscience. One ought rather to follow one's
conscience than the judgment of the Church, where one is certain." '10
The question of the obligatory force of the erroneous conscience was
also much debated by the thirteenth century scholastic philosophers."'
Aquinas himself takes up this issue in the excerpts Noonan provides.'4 2
"Conscience," Aquinas asserted, "is a certain application of knowledge
to some action.' 143 Because conscience is based on knowledge, which
itself is derived from reason,'" it might fall into error because reason can
be flawed.45 For instance, reason might mistakenly teach one that to
follow Christ is bad, even though one thereby repudiates a good
necessary to salvation.'" But even though the erring judgment has
proposed that what is good is actually bad, "it is proposed by erring
reason as true."' 47 Because this is the case, the will is obliged to follow
reason or act against its perception of what is good.'4
Aquinas's defense of the erring conscience has been recognized as
an important step for the subsequent development of a right to religious
liberty.'49 Aquinas, however, subverted the force of this doctrine when
139. See X.5.39.44.
140. See Bernard of Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X.5.39.44, casus. Brian Tierney has called
attention to the importance of this development: "We are not dealing here with a right to
religious liberty but with a duty to obey one's conscience. Still, an emphasis on the primacy of the
individual conscience was an important element in later theories of religious rights." See Tierney,
Religious Rights, supra note 98, at 25.
141. See 2 ODoN LolriN, PSYCHOLOGIE ET MORALE AuX XIIE ET MiE SItCLES 354-
406 (1948).
142. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29 at 42-5.
143. See id. at 42 (quoting Summa theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 19, art. 5, 3).
144. See Id.
145. "[N]ot only that which is indifferent can accidentally take on the character of good or
bad, but that which is good can take on the character of bad, or that which is bad can take on the
character of good because of the apprehension of the reason." NOONAN, BELIEVER AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29 (quoting Summa theologiae, Prima secundae, q. 19, art. 5,3).
146. See id.
147. Id. Aquinas continues: "Consequently [even erring reason] is derived from God, from
Whom is every truth." Id
148. "But when erring reason proposes something as the commandment of God, then it is
the same thing to flout the dictate of reason and the commandment of God." Id
149. See Tierney, Religious Rights, supra note 98, at 24-5; JOSEPH LECLER, TOLERATION
AND REFORMATION 1, 99 (1960). Noonan observes: "Taken seriously, this doctrine carried the
seed of religious liberty." See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra
note 29, at 41.
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he taught that one whose conscience has fallen into error might be held
morally responsible for that error where it is the result either directly...
or indirectly... of negligence. ... ",o But Aquinas also conceded that
error might be "involuntary," arising from "ignorance... apart from
any negligence.... "' In this respect, Aquinas's argument opened an
important pathway, explored by later generations of writers, to an
expanded notion of freedom of conscience.'52
3. Joan of Arc
In February 1429, with the continued political survival of the French
King Charles VII of Valois threatened by English and Burgundian
military victories, a teenage peasant girl named Joan from the village of
Domr6my presented herself at the royal court, claiming that voices she
regularly heard had sent her on a mission to save the throne for
Charles." After being subjected to rigorous theological scrutiny, Joan
was allowed to lead men into battle for the French cause and won
important victories at Ori~ans and elsewhere.'- Her victories ultimately
led to Charles's coronation at Rheims 5 but also to her capture by
Burgundians fighting for the English, who in turn ransomed her to the
English.' The English, convinced that Joan must have been in league
with the devil, put her on trial for witchcraft and heresy, among other
charges."
The trial, held before an ecclesiastical tribunal, was actually
conducted to advance the English cause. Here, interpenetration caused
ecclesiastical interests to be subordinated to raw political interests. The
presiding judge, the Bishop of Beauvais, Pierre Cauchon, "was not quite
sixty, an accomplished diplomat, whose patron in promotion to office
had been the duke of Burgundy and whose services had been used
150. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note, 29 at 44
(quoting Swnma theologiae, Prima secundae, q. 19, art. 6).
151. Id
152. See LECLER, supra note 149, at 99-100.
153. See JOHN HOLLAND SMITH, JOAN OF ARC 46-55 (1973) (discussing Joan's mission to
the king) Joan has been the subject of numerous and important literary studies. See, eg.: JULFS
ICHELET, JEANNE D'ARC (1890); MARK IWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECrIONS OF JOAN OF
ARC (1899); GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN: A CHRONICLE PLAY IN SIX SCENES AND
AN EPILOGUE (1930); HLAIRE BELLOC, JOAN OF ARC (1949).
154. See SMITH, supra note 153, at 55-79.
155. See id. at 71-79.
156. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 45.
157. The records of Joan's trial have been published as PROC S DE CONDAMNATION DE
JEANNE D'ARC (Pierre Tisset & Yvonne Lanhers eds., 1960), 3 vols.
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before by [King] Henry VI of England."' Convicted of heresy in May
1431, Joan was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment and found five
days later to have relapsed when, denied the opportunity to wear
women's clothes, she was forced instead to resume wearing men's attire.
... On the morning of May 30, 1431, Cauchon remitted Joan to the
executioners, and she was promptly burnt at the stake. 60 In 1449,
Charles VII ordered an inquiry into the validity of the trial, and in 1456
the inquiry responded by renouncing the original verdict.6, In 1920,
Joan was canonized as a Catholic saint. 62
Noonan draws his sources from the inquiry Charles launched in
1449, and edits and arranges his excerpts as a sort of medieval morality
play, exploring how a system dedicated to the promotion of religious
faith could end in the execution of one later found to be a saint.'9 As
Noonan explains, lawyers and theologians who had played a role in
Joan's judicial murder tried to present their behavior more favorably.
One man, Ysambert, who had helped to find Joan guilty,'6 later recalled
that he advised Joan to appeal to the Council of Basel as a means of
removing the action from the court of the Bishop of Beauvais' 1 Others
cast doubt on the procedure used to convict Joan: Jean Toutmouille and
Martin Ladvenu recounted Joan's declaration to the Bishop of Beauvais
that she was to be put to death because of the mistreatment she suffered
at the hands of the English,' 66 while the notary Guillaume Manchon
recounted English efforts to corrupt his attempt at keeping an honest
record.'67 Jean Massieu remembered that Joan was "set up," forced to
wear men's clothes by her English jailers who were looking for an
158. NOONAN, BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 46.
159. See id. at 45.
160. Although the law required the Church to abandon the heretic to the secular arm which
would then pronounce the judgment of death, it seems that the secular authority simply omitted
the formality of pronouncing its own condemnation in Joan's case. See SMITH, supra note 153, at
172-73. Joan's death would be at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities.
161. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29 at 45-46.
The results of the inquiry can be found in P. DONCOEUR & Y. LANHERS, LA RtHABILITATION
DE JEANNE LA PUCELLE. L'ENQUETE ORDONNtE PAR CHARLES VII (1956).
162. See Henry Ansgar Kelly, Joan of Arc's Last Tria The Attack of the Devil's Advocates,
in FRESH VERDICTS ON JOAN OF ARC 205 (Bonnie Wheeler & Charles T. Wood eds.,
1996)(discussing the canonization process).
163. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 45-51.
164. See ia. at 46.
165. See id4 at 46-47.
166. See id at 47-48.
167. See id. at 48-49. To relieve his guilty conscience, Manchon bought a missal with the
payment he received for the trial, in order to pray for Joan's soul. See id. at 49.
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excuse to put her to death'68 Beaup~re, professor of theology at the
University of Paris and an expert at Joan's trial, repeated his belief that
Joan's voices were not supernatural, but criticized the conduct of the
trial.
169
Throughout his explication of these events, Noonan unites some of
the themes he has been exploring: Augustine's doctrine of state-
enforced religious orthodoxy had been given further logical rigor by
Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics and had been codified into canon
law by generations of lawyers. The lawyers and philosophers, in good
scholastic fashion, advanced arguments based on Scripture and the
obligation to follow one's conscience that pointed toward a more
tolerant position. But these arguments were never more than strawmen,
fit only to be knocked down. The interpenetration of the ecclesiastical
and the secular led to its own abuses. Ecclesiastical involvement with
state affairs could corrupt the religious conscience, as it did with Ralegh
and Bratton. Indeed, the church could even become the handmaiden of
the state, as it did in the trial of Joan of Arc, where a politicized bishop,
currying favor with English secular authorities, engineered the
martyrdom of a saint. Noonan thus comprehensively makes the point
that the system had failed. However, a revolution was needed to uproot
it.
D. New Doctrines of Tolerance
In 1517, Martin Luther, by traditional account, nailed to the door of
Wittenberg Cathedral his 95 Theses challenging papal authority on a
number of subjects 7-- an act that led to the fracturing of an already
brittle Christian unity."' Luther's defiance, Noonan observes, "did not
bring religious toleration but increased religious persecution."" Much
of Europe plunged into intermittent warfare that would endure for over
a century. France erupted from 1559 to 1598 into a series of civil wars
known collectively as the "Wars of Religion." 173 Protestant England and
168. See id. at 50-51.
169. See id at 51. Beaup~re believed that Joan was ill-served in the advice she received: "In
my opinion, if Joan had had wise and frank directors, she would have spoken many words useful
for her justification and not spoken several which made for her condemnation." Il
170. See 95 THESES, WITH THE PERTINENT DOCuMENTS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE
REFORMATION (Kurt Aland ed., 1967).
171. The opening phase of the Reformation is the subject of countless works. One recent
and important account is CARTER LINDBERG, THE EUROPEAN REFORMATIONS 56-90 (1996).
172. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 61.
173. See RJ. KNECHT, THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION, 1559-98 (2d ed. 1996). These
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Catholic Spain engaged in intermittent warfare in the late sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries,74 and most of Central Europe, including the
majority of present-day Germany, was laid to waste from 1618 to 1648
during the Thirty Years' War.175 Indeed, it was only with the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648 that the European states agreed to refrain from
interfering in the religious affairs of other states.176 The European states
also continued to repress dissenters within their boundaries during the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.1" Focusing on England,
Noonan gives the example of the succession of Catholic and Protestant
martyrs executed during the reigns, respectively, of King Henry VIII
and Queen Mary.78
wars were brought to a close by the Edict of Nantes, which "gave the Huguenots [dissenting
Protestants] a large measure of toleration.... [but] fell far short of what many Protestants would
have liked" given the restrictions on worship it continued to impose. Id at 80-81.
174. Cf. WILLIAM BROWN PATTERSON, KING JAMES VI AND I AND THE REUNION OF
CHRISTENDOM (1997).
175. See Robert Bireley, The Thirty Years' War as Germany's Religious War, in KRIEG UND
POLITK 1618-1648: EUROPAISCHE PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN 85 (Konrad Repgen ed.,
1988) (discussing the religious character of the Thirty Years' War). Cf., GEOFFREY PARKER,
EUROPE IN CRISIS 1598-1648 (1980); THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (Geoffrey Parker ed., 1984)
(including two important general treatments of the conflict).
176. Leo Gross observes: "The Peace of Westphalia consecrated the principle of [religious]
toleration by establishing the equality between Protestant and Catholic states and by providing
some safeguards for religious minorities. To be sure, the principle of liberty of conscience was
applied only incompletely and without reciprocity." Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-
1948,42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20,21-22 (1948).
177. Several Catholic countries established or enhanced state-run inquisitorial apparatus in
order to investigate the new "heretical" Protestant beliefs. For example, the Netherlands
vigorously prosecuted Lutherans and Anabaptists in the first half of the sixteenth century;, the
Spanish inquisition, originally established in 1478, inquired into the loyalties of converted Jews; a
Portuguese inquisition based on the Spanish model was established in the late 1530s; and the
Roman inquisition, supervised by a standing committee of six cardinals, was charged with the
responsibility of uprooting heresy in the papal states. See E. William Monter, Inquisition, 2
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE REFORMATION 317-319 (Hans Hillerbrand ed., 1996).
Protestants also persecuted dissenters. In a famous case, Michael Servetus, an anti-trinitarian
polemicist, was executed in Calvinist Geneva in 1553. See Jerome Friedman, Servetus, Michael, 4
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE REFORMATION 48-49. England saw the forcible suppression
of Catholics. Other Catholic martyrs include St. Thomas More, St. John Fisher (1535) and St.
Edmund Campion (1581).
178. Noonan quotes from a letter Thomas More wrote to his daughter Margaret, about
April 17, 1534, to explain to her why he had refused to sign the oath Henry VIII required his
subjects to swear to signify their acceptance of the Act of Submission which declared invalid
Henry's marriage with Catherine of Aragon and promising obedience to the offspring of Henry
and his new bride, Anne Boleyn. Failure to take the oath amounted to "misprision of high
treason" and carried with it the death penalty. Thomas More declared to his daughter. "[A]s for
myself in good faith my conscience so moved me in the matter that though I would not refuse to
swear to the succession, yet unto the oath that there was offered me I could not swear without the
risking of my soul to perpetual damnation." NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
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But while the Reformation did not embody within itself the principle
of religious tolerance, Noonan finds three factors related to the events
of the Reformation responsible for its gradual development: smaller
religious sects, such as the Mennonites, found it strategically
advantageous to assert a strict separation of worldly and spiritual
authorities;17 the religious wars had been fought largely to stalemates,
causing the authorities to view the stalemates as "reasonable" ;o and the
spread of the belief that the Christian life itself demanded the "rejection
of unspiritual means for the protection of the spiritual kingdom." 
18
Noonan thus explores the various arguments made on behalf of
religious tolerance. Menno Simons is presented as defending strict
discipline within the community of believers, but as simultaneously
asserting that worldly authorities were entirely disabled from using force
to support religious orthodoxy.' 2 Baruch Spinoza, for his part, is seen to
have defended an essentially non-religious doctrine of religious
toleration."n Secularizing the concept of natural rights,"84 Spinoza
argued that "no one can transfer to another his own natural faculty of
reasoning freely and judging about everything whatsoever; nor can he
be compelled to do so."" Further, if the individual may not cede his
ARE, supra note 29, at 54-55. At trial, More defended himself with "the commanding argument
that human law could not judge what Thomas Aquinas called 'interioribus motibus and
Christopher St German described as 'inward things." See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF
THOMAS MORE 400 (1998). More was executed in 1535. Noonan follows his account of Thomas
More with an account of the executions of Nicholas Ridley and Hugh Latimer. In 1553, Mary,
daughter of Henry and his first wife, succeeded to the throne and attempted to return England to
the Catholic fold by forcibly suppressing Protestants, thereby proving that "Catholics had not yet
learned anything from More's martyrdom." NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE, supra note 29, at 57. Noonan's excerpt is taken from John Foxe's Book of Martyrs, and
demonstrates the bravery with which Ridley and Latimer approached their executions.
179. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 61.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Menno's reply to Gellius Faber states: "I would say... if the magistracy rightly
understood Christ and His kingdom, they would in my opinion rather choose death than to
meddle with their worldly power and sword in spiritual matters which are reserved not to the
judgment of man but to the judgment of the great and Almighty God alone." See NOONAN, THE
BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 63.
183. See id. at 71-75.
184. On the twelfth and thirteenth century origins of natural rights in canon law, see BRIAN
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW,
AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1626 (1997); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Thirteenth-Century Canon Law and
Rights: The Word ius and Its Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295 (1996);
and Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition" An
Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L REV. 37 (1991).
185. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 72.
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judgment to the state, neither does the state possess the absolute
capacity to oppress its citizens.'6 Indeed, Spinoza asserts, the "ultimate
end" of the commonwealth is "liberty. "'8
Noonan, however, focuses his analysis on the contributions of Roger
Williams and John Locke. A strict Puritan "separatist" who rejected the
ties the Massachusetts colonial establishment continued to retain with
the Church of England, Williams had continual difficulty with political
and religious establishments both in the New and the Old Worlds.", He
eventually established the colony of Rhode Island as a refuge for
separatists like himself and for members of other religious
denominations, including Jews.1 9 Williams's writings on the separation
of church and state have been frequently used and misused by the
judiciary, and also seen by American legal scholars as a foundation
stone of contemporary church-state law."
Noonan particularly emphasizes the religious foundation of
Williams's thinking on religious liberty.191 Williams insisted on a sharp
line between church and state; indeed, he sought a "wall of separation
between the garden of the church and wilderness of this world."1" The
wall was intended to protect the true church from the corruption of the
186. See Id. at 73.
187. l On the freedom to believe as one wishes, Spinoza wrote:
If, therefore, no one can yield his freedom of judging and feeling what he wishes and
if everyone by the greatest law of nature is master of his own thoughts, it follows
that never in a commonwealth, except with unhappy results, can it be attempted to
have human beings, who think diverse and contrary things, speak only what is
prescribed for them by the Supreme Powers.
Id.
188. See EDMUND S. MORGAN & ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 3-27
(1967).
189. Noonan notes regarding Jews in Rhode Island that "[t]here were traces of Jewish life in
the seventeenth century, and by 1763 there was a synagogue and a Jewish community equal to
about 1 percent of the population of this town of 6,000.... But in Rhode Island, Jews were
denied both office and the vote." NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE,
supra note 29, at 98.
190. A summary of judicial and scholarly treatments of Roger Williams may be found in
TIMOTHY HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 1-15 (1998).
191. Noonan states: "On the foundation of the teaching of Jesus Christ, Williams
proclaimed a gospel of liberty of religious belief." NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS
THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 67.
192. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 65 (quoting
Letter of Roger Williams to John Cotton).
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outside world.' 93 But the wall's breaking, Williams continued, made the
garden "a wilderness as at this day."' 9 The civil and spiritual authorities
have fundamentally different competencies, and where they are
intermingled, Christian believers are put at great risk.195
In his Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Williams acknowledged that his
commitment to religious freedom could have radical implications for the
relationship between the state and the believer, but asserted that God
Himself requires liberty:1
[I]t is the will and command of God, that (since the coming of
his son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most paganish,
Jewish, Turkish, or antichristian consciences and worships be
granted to all men in all nations and countries: and they are to
be fought against with that sword which is only (in soul matters)
able to conquer, to wit, the sword of God's spirit, the word of
God.1 7
Noonan gives further heed to the attention Williams paid to the
individual conscience by excerpting a letter to John Endecott, the
Governor of Massachusetts, in which Williams declared:
I speak of Conscience, a persuasion fixed in the mind and heart
of a man, which enforceth him to judge... and to do so and so,
with respect to God, His worship, etc .... This conscience is
found in all mankind, more or less, in Jews, Turks, Papists,
Protestants, Pagans, etc .... 8
193. See id. at 66-67.
194. i& at 66.
195. See id. at 67.
196. "[A]I civil states with their officers of justice in their respective constitutions and
administrations are proved essentially civil, and therefore not judges, governors, or defenders of
the spiritual or Christian state and worship." (quoted in NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 67.)
197. Id. Williams distinguished between two types of laws "respecting religion," those that
"concern the acts of worship and the worship itself, the ministers of it, their fitness or unfitness, to
be suppressed or established;.., for such laws we find no footing in the New Testament of Jesus
Christ." Id. at 69. The second category are those that "merely concern the civil state," such as the
granting of "immunity and freedom from tax and toll [which] may be granted to the people of
such or such a religion, as the magistrate pleaseth." Id.
19& Id. at 70. Conscience, however, was not limitless: Williams acknowledged that there
might be no room allowed for conscientious objection to military service where the survival of the
commonwealth was at stake. See id. at 71.
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Freedom of conscience, subordinated by Thomas Aquinas to the need
to enforce orthodoxy and prosecute heresy, now became the
cornerstone of a different vision of Christianity-one that sought to
protect the true believers from aggressive state power.
Noonan sees John Locke - like Roger Williams - as a religious
thinker whose theological investigations colored all he did."9  In his
proof of God,2 his defense of the freedom of the will,20' his endorsement
of natural law,m and many other matters, Locke advanced traditional
religious, often scholastic, arguments. Locke is seen today as a secular
political philosopher, Noonan asserts, "only because modern interests
have been less theological than his. "20
Locke, as Noonan presents him, sought to ground his arguments less
on the inviolable sanctity of conscience than on a theory of the limited
competencies of the ecclesiastical and civil powers. The church, as much
as the state, in Locke's estimation, was a voluntary joining of persons for
certain, limited ends.20 He is quite prepared to argue scripture with
199. Noonan observes:
[Locke] was a master theologian with his own view of revelation and its exposition,
with his own very clear, very moderate, very persuasive vision of the essentials of
Christianity free from the dogma and the controversies, the elaborations, and, as he
thought, the quibbles that had marred that exposition up to his time.
NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 76.
200. See Noonan, Protestant Philosophy of John Locke, supra note 26, at 95-7.
201. See id. at 100-01.
202 See id at 101-02.
203. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 76.
204. In his definition of "church," Locke states:
Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a voluntary
society of men, joining themselves of their own accord in order to the public
worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual
to the salvation of their souls. I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is
born a member of any church ....
NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 81 (quoting Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration). The problem with this definition is simply that many churches do
not consider themselves to be voluntary societies. This was as true in Locke's day as it is in ours.
Thus Jews see themselves as "the chosen people, to whom God revealed the Jewish tradition on
Mount Sinai." See Michael Broyde, Proselytizing and Jewish Law: Inreach, Outreach, and the
Jewish Tradition 7 (typescript). The Jewish tradition avoids proselytism and discourages
conversion. See id. at 1-2. Furthermore, "[t]here is no right of exit in the Jewish tradition." Id at
2. The 1983 Code of Canon Law, binding upon Latin-rite Catholics, also greatly restricts the
capacity to leave the Church. While the law recognizes that individuals might fall away from their
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those who disagree.'
Locke's purpose in writing "is to distinguish exactly the business of
civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that
lie between the one and the other. "2 "Toleration," he begins, "[is] the
chief characteristic mark of the true Church. "2 Locke furthermore sees
the church as having only a limited purpose or "end," which is "the
public worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal
life. '" He continues, "[a]l discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that
end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined."' Missing
entirely is any notion of a church as a community of believers seeking to
transform the world.
The civil power, for its part, also is seen to possess only limited
powers and purposes: "The commonwealth seems to me to be a society
of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing
their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and
indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money,
lands, houses, furniture, and the like., 210 While the civil magistrate is
obliged to "the impartial execution of equal laws,, 211 he can never
belief, "it retains the tradition in law that those who have come into full communion with the
Catholic Church are never able to withdraw from the Church's law, even if they do cease to be in
full communion." CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 129 (James A. Coriden
et al. eds., 1985).
205. This is evident, for instance, in Locke's rejection of those who argue that apostolic
succession and the office of bishop are necessary features of the true church:
Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true church
unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling authority derived from the very
apostles, and continued down to the present times by an uninterrupted succession.
To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which Christ
has imposed that law upon the Church. And let not any man think me impertineni,
if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms of that edict be very express
and positive; for the promise He has made us, that 'wheresoever two or three are
gathered together' in his name, He will be in the midst of them (Mt. 18:20) seems to
imply the contrary.
NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 82 (quoting Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration).
206. Id. at 80.
207. Id. at 78.
208. Idt at 83.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 80.
211. Id
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exercise "the care of souls," even if the people attempt to consent to it.21
This is because God has conferred on no one "such authority... over
another as to compel anyone to his religion. 
213
Taking a narrow view of the competence of the civil magistrate,
Locke is unwilling to concede that one might conscientiously disobey a
lawfully constituted command.214 Locke is also unwilling to tolerate
certain types of religious believers in his commonwealth. Unlike
Williams, who expressed a willingness to permit both "papists" and
"Turks," Locke is unwilling to allow either.21 5 Finally, Locke is entirely
unwilling to concede any room to non-believers.2 6 In identifying beliefs
that were not to be tolerated, Locke effectively undercuts his claim that
the civil magistrate is never to exercise compulsion over matters of
conscience.
E. Observations
In his historical introduction to the relationship between the believer
212- Id.
213. Id.
214. But some may ask:
What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his authority that appear unlawful
to the conscience of a private person? I answer that, if government be faithfully
administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the public
good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say, that such a
private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to
undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private
judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public
good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation.
Id at 88.
215. Locke indirectly challenges the status of Catholics, fearing that they intend "to seize
the Government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects;" Id
at 89. He also asserts that "Mahometans," who are bound in "blind obedience to the Mufti of
Constantinople... [and] the Ottoman Emperor" are not to be tolerated because of allegiance to
a foreign prince. Id
216.
Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises,
covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon
an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all;
besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have
no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration.
See id. at 89-90. Locke fails to consider that while the atheist lacks "religion," he or she still has
conscience and might feel himself conscientiously compelled to his atheistic stance. See id.
[83:367
THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM
and governmental power, Noonan explores with an artist's attention to
detail the many dimensions of this relationship. He locates at the very
beginning of the tradition the Ten Commandments and the Hebrew and
Christian scriptures- the building blocks of a theology of religious
liberty. In passages like those drawn from Isaiah and Maccabees, one
sees the claims of a higher law being advanced against state authority.
But conscience need not always be in opposition to state power. In his
depiction of St. Augustine, Noonan considers the advice the leading
Christian theologian of his time dispensed to Christian office-holders on
proper behavior in office.
However, St. Augustine was also the first to offer a systematically
argued polemic in favor of the persecution of religious dissenters. The
justifications Augustine put forward took deep root and led to the
excesses seen in the trial of Joan of Arc. Only after the fratricide
associated with the Reformation had run its course did religious
believers develop a theology that tolerated groups of believers with
views different from their own. Among those believers, Williams and
Locke were particularly important for American developments because
of their influence on American thinkers of the eighteenth century.
Noonan emphasizes that both Williams and Locke grounded their
doctrines of toleration in theology: Williams understood "separateness"
as essential to the welfare of the true Church, while Locke used
Scripture and theological disputation as means by which he fashioned a
doctrine of limited toleration.
Williams and Locke, however, still belonged to a world in which
religious persecution thrived in England and in her transatlantic
colonies. Much more would have to happen to change the legal regime
by which the interests of established churches were favored and
dissenters punished.
III. THE CREATION OF THE NEW WORLD
Conscience, Noonan relates, could be as badly violated in the New
World as in the Old. In seventeenth century colonial America, believers
were put to death for daring to carry out the demands of their
consciences. There was nothing inevitable about the eventual
recognition of religious liberty. Indeed, Noonan demonstrates, the
protection for free exercise of religion found in the Bill of Rights is
largely the result of the insight of one man, James Madison, who drew
upon a background shaped by theological and historical reflection and
the experience of having witnessed first-hand the persecution of
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religious dissenters. Madison's insight, preserved in the First
Amendment, would serve in the first years of the American Republic to
soften religious conflict and to set a standard by which official action
infringing the believer's conscience, whether at federal or state level,
could be criticized.
A. Continued Persecution
While one sees in the late seventeenth century the emergence of
theorists willing to challenge the commitment of state power to the
enforcement of religious orthodoxy, these writers by no means
represented the mainstream of thought. Baruch Spinoza was
excommunicated by the Dutch synagogue to which he belonged and had
his work condemned by the Synod of Delft.21 7 Williams was in continual
trouble with authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. 8 Even Locke felt
compelled to anonymously publish An Essay on Toleration, to which he
never publicly acknowledged authorship."9
To be sure, the mainstream continued to belong to the advocates of
persecution. This was as true in Europe as in colonial America. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony, whose Puritan founders viewed it as "a city
upon a Hill" set up as an example to the world,m took steps early in its
history to ensure religious orthodoxy.2' The Puritan establishment,
being Congregationalist and therefore lacking a strong central
hierarchy, found it necessary to rely upon the civil magistracy "to
maintain and promote uniform religious practice."222 Leading New
England thinkers developed a theology to justify such close cooperation.
In 1632, a "devout, grace-oriented man of God, 'tm the Cambridge-
educated Puritan pastor John Cotton (1584-1652), was forced to flee to
217. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 71-72.
218. A precocious youth who enjoyed the patronage of Sir Edward Coke, Williams
experienced recurrent trouble with authorities during much of his life. These are detailed at
many points in EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN
AMERICA (1991).
219. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 77.
220. Id. at 64 (quoting Sermon of John Winthrop, 1630).
221. "New England Puritans sought liberty to create a holy commonwealth, and those who
partook of their vision could be partakers of the same liberty. But the only freedom guaranteed
by the Puritans to religious dissenters was, as Nathaniel Ward put it succinctly, the freedom 'to
keep away from us.'" See HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 190, at 55-56
(quoting NATHANIEL WARD, THE SIMPLE COBLER OF AGGAWAM IN AMERICA).
222. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1986).
223. EVERETr EMERSON, JOHN COTTON 4 (rev. ed. 1990).
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the Massachusetts Bay Colony to escape persecution by King Charles I
and Archbishop William Laud.' Quickly establishing himself as a
preeminent religious authority in New England, Cotton participated in
Williams's banishment and was himself a target of Williams's polemic,
The Bloudy Tenent.22 He answered Williams most comprehensively in
The Bloudy Tenent Washed, and Made White in the Bloud of the
Lambe.'
Cotton distinguished between an "inward peace of the Church
[which is] spiritual and heavenly" and an "outward peace" which princes
and magistrates would do well to enforce.2 Indeed, Cotton asserted,
"[i]t is a matter of just displeasure to God, and sad greife of heart to the
Church, when Civil States look at the estate of the Church, as of little, or
no concernment to themselves."229  Cotton conceded that it was
improper to punish one who had "an erroneous and blinde
conscience,"'  but taught that the appropriate remedy was "once or
twice Admonition." If the dissenter still persisted "in the error of his
way," he "[was] not persecuted for cause of conscience, but for sinning
against his Conscience."2 3'  While Cotton believed that ecclesiastical
sanction was sufficient where heretics were concerned,' he endorsed
the imposition of severe civil sanctions against "Apostate Seducers, and
Idolaters, and Blasphemers."2 3
224. See id. at 1-4; See also IRwiN H. POLISHOOK, ROGER WILLIAMS, JOHN COTTON AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A CONTROvERSY IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND 14-15 (1967).
225. See EMERSON, supra note 223, at 104-05.
226. See PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIs CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN
TRADmON 74-101 (1953).
227. See JOHN COTTON, THE BLOUDY TENENT WASHED, AND MADE WHITE IN THE
BLOUD OFTHE LAMB (reprint 1972) (1647).
228. Ia at13.
229. Id. at 12.
230. Id. at 26.
231. Id. at 26-27.
232. See id. at 27.
233. Id. at 138. The "due punishment" of these three categories of offenders, according
to Cotton, had the following beneficial effects:
First, it putteth away evil from the people, and cutteth off a Gangreene, which
would spread to further ungodlinesse.... Second, it driveth away Wolves from
worrying, and scattering the Sheep of Christ. For false Teachers be Wolves...
Thirdly, such Executions upon such evill doers causeth all the Country to heare and
feare, and doe no more such wickednesse.... Fourthly, the punishments executed
upon false Prophets, and seducing Teachers, doe bring downe showers of Gods
blessings upon the civil State.... Fifthly, it is an honour to Gods Justice, that such
Judgements are executed....
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It is in this context that Noonan resumes his narrative. The Society
of Friends, or Quakers, "born at the tag end of that great seventeenth
century religious revival of which Puritanism itself had been the
mainstay, created a furious turbulence on both sides of the Atlantic."24
Radically challenging the religious establishment of its day,.5 Quakers
began to infiltrate New England in the mid-1650s.2
The response of the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony was to
enact a series of anti-Quaker laws:
Alien Quakers were to be apprehended, jailed, whipped, and
deported. Ship captains bringing in Quakers were to be fined
100 pounds.... Anyone harboring a Quaker was also to be fined
and imprisoned. The importation of Quaker literature became
criminal. By 1658 it was also criminal to propose Quaker
doctrine at a church meeting or to approve of any known Quaker
or the Quaker's tenets. The penalties were a fine and a
whipping. Security had to be given not to repeat the offense. If
security were not given, the offender was to be banished, any
return to the colony subject to the penalties provided for the
return of deported stranger Quakers.
Return was a particular problem. In 1657 the General Court
prescribed for banished male Quakers who came back that they
should lose one ear, a second time the other ear; females were to
be severely whipped. On a third return, they should have their
tongues bored through with a hot iron. A year later, on October
19, 1658, the ultimate penalty, death by hanging, was provided
for banished Quakers who returned. 7
Id
234. CURRY, supra note 222, at 21.
235. Curry observes:
Quakers not only provoked and heroically endured persecution, but actively sought
it. By obstreperous or shocking behavior, such as interrupting church services to
testify against false worship or going naked to symbolize the condition of their
opponents' spiritual state, they drove the authorities, especially in America, to
paroxysms of rage that begot savage punishment.
See id. at 21; see generally Carla Gardina Pestana, The City Upon a Hill Under Siege: The Puritan
Perception of the Quaker Threat to Massachusetts Bay, 1656-61,56 NEW ENG. Q. 323 (1983).
236. See Pestana, supra note 235, at 323-25.
237. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 51.
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In the years 1656 to 1661, at least forty Quakers from England,
Rhode Island, and Barbados "filtered into the Bay Colony to witness
against Congregationalist New England."2" The Puritan establishment
responded forcefully. "The milder penalties such as flogging were
inflicted on men and women alike.""9  Two children were sold into
bondage "when their Quaker parents were unable to pay a fine."'4 "By
1661, two Englishmen, one woman from Rhode Island, and a man from
Barbados had been hanged, and Boston jail was full of Quakers."41
Even though the English government ordered a halt to the executions in
1661,242 the imposition of lesser sanctions on Quakers continued for
another twenty years, and the death penalty was not actually repealed
by the Massachusetts legislature until 1681.243 This persecution, Noonan
asserts, was "successful": "Quakers came to avoid Massachusetts;
Quaker societies did not flourish in the commonwealth. "2
The persecution of Quakers, Noonan emphasizes, is an important
part of the story of religious liberty: it shows "[t]hat neither the soil of
America, nor the experience of having suffered persecution, nor explicit
belief in freedom of conscience were sufficient in themselves to prevent
men [from] carrying out persecution on account of religion. "2 45 While
other colonies did not engage in the violent repression of religious
dissent, no colony ever permitted "complete religious freedom. " The
steps that led to the adoption of the First Amendment's protection of
religious liberty resulted not from a logically necessary unfolding of
events, but from the interplay of singular insight and experience with
historical opportunity.
B. James Madison's Theology of Religious Liberty and Its Constitutional
Significance
Architect of the First Amendment, James Madison was born into a
religious family and baptized into the Christian faith in March 1751.47
238. Pestana, supra note 235, at 323.
239. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 51.
240. Id at 52.
241. Pestana, supra note 235, at 325.
242. See CURRY, supra note 222, at 22.
243. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 53.
244. I& at 54.
245. Id
246. Id at 55.
247. See RALPH KETCHAM: JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 9 (1971).
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His father, James Madison, Sr., was a prominent tobacco planter, slave
holder, and vestryman in the Anglican Church.2 8 In June 1762, at the
age of eleven, Madison was enrolled in the school run by Donald
Robertson.249 There he learned Latin and was exposed to works of
Christian piety like Thomas A Kempis's Imitation of Christ.m Beginning
at the age of sixteen, he was tutored for two years by Reverend Thomas
Martin, a member of the Anglican Church and a recent graduate of the
College of New Jersey who lived in the Madison household.'
In 1769, Madison enrolled in the College of New Jersey, 2 which
would later become Princeton University, but was then a Presbyterian
college dedicated both to the training of Christian ministers for the New
World 3 and to the promotion of a Presbyterianism that could be "a
vital, personally felt force in the lives.., of laymen. "2- Madison was
introduced to the College's theology, 5 which drew deeply from the
English dissenting tradition 6 and stressed the importance of "free
enquiry" and "private judgment" in arriving at religious truth.'
Following graduation, in the fall of 1771, Madison stayed on at
248. See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST 51-52 (1941).
Brant describes the duties of a vestryman:
The church at that time was part of the established government, and the vestry
served as an ecclesiastical police court and tax-levying body. It was part of the
official duty of the elder Madison and other vestrymen, through the churchwardens,
to See that nobody save physicians rode a horse on a Sunday except to church, to
punish the use of profane language, to arrest the rector himself if he drank too much
on court day (as happened occasionally in some parishes) and to put Baptists in jail
fore preaching without a license. The last apparently was left by Madison to others.
Id. at 51-52.
249. See KETCHAM, supra note 247, at 19-20.
250. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 64.
251. See KETCHAM, supra note 247, at 21.
252. See id. at 25-28. Madison's decision itself must have been rooted in religious belief,
given his father's status as vestryman in the Church of England and the prominence of the
College of William and Mary in the life of Virginia. See BRANT, supra note 248, at 67-68.
253. See id. at 31.
254. Id. at28.
255. Ketcham records that "religious instruction was incessant, especially on Sunday." Id at
30. Elsewhere, Ketcham adds: "The other foundation stone [in addition to training in the Greek
and Latin classics] of learning in Madison's day, and of his education, was the Christian tradition.
Down through his graduation from college every one of Madison's teachers ... was either a
clergyman or a devoutly orthodox Christian layman." I&. at 46.
256. See id. at 28-29.
257. Id. at 31 (quoting SAMUEL BLAIR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY
(1764)).
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Princeton some months more, studying the Hebrew language with John
Witherspoon,"' president of the College and a preeminent Christian
thinker."9 Madison returned home to the Virginia Piedmont region of
his family in early 1772 to recuperate from illness and to ponder the
choice of careers. During this time he also engaged in "serious study of
the Scriptures and theology."2° Although Madison ultimately spent his
life in public affairs, a leading biographer believes these early religious
experiences shaped his thinking to the end of his days. 1
Noonan stresses the importance of this background in explaining an
exchange of correspondence between Madison and his closest friend
from the College of New Jersey, William Bradford.' Bradford, who
was trying to decide upon a career path, wrote to Madison to seek his
advice. However, Bradford had admonished Madison that whatever
advice he gave, he must not recommend the ministry."" Disappointed
that the Church would thereby lose "a fine genius and persuasive
Orator," Madison advised his friend that whatever his choice of careers,
he should "always keep the Ministry obliquely in view. "m In this way,
258. See id at 51.
259. Witherspoon's biographer notes that "Witherspoon had been selected to preside over a
college which, though not a seminary, would train Presbyterian ministers. Neither a speculative
man nor one given to playing with ideas, he saw his commission as turning students directly to the
truth as Presbyterians of the time saw it." MARTHA Lou LEMMON STOHLMAN, JOHN
WrrHERSPOON: PARSON, POLITICIAN, PATIuOT 75 (1989). In the area of church-state relations,
Witherspoon drafted a Form of Government for the American Presbyterian Church that declared
that "'the rights of private judgment, in all matters that respect religion, [is] universal and
inalienable,'" and second, that the "'civil power'" should not assist "'any religious constitution...
farther than may be necessary for protection and security."' James Hastings Nichols, John
Witherspoon on Church and State, 42 J. PRESBY ERIAN HIT. 166,169 (1964) (citation omitted).
A Madison biographer notes that throughout the 1770s and 1780s "[t]he personal relationship
between Madison and Witherspoon was unusually strong." Ralph L Ketcham, James Madison
and Religion-A New Hypothesis, 38 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. SOC. 65,71 (1960). Ketcham also
notes that Witherspoon and Madison served together in the Confederation Congresses of 1781
and 1782 and that Witherspoon, on behalf of Princeton University, spoke warmly of Madison in
conferring on him an honorary degree following the Constitutional Convention. See idt
260. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion, supra note 259, at 73.
261. Ketcham stresses that Madison was deeply influenced by the Scottish "common-sense"
philosophy of Witherspoon, which "appealed to the 'common sense' of mankind for 'proof that
there was a God in Heaven and a moral order on earth.'" 1d. at 70. Ketcham goes on to trace
Madison's commitment to religious freedom to his religiously-grounded insight that because
human reason was finite freedom had to prevail in the area of religious inquiry. See id at 76.
262- See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 65-66.
263. See Letter of James Madison to William Bradford, September 25,1773, in 1 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 95,96 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1962).
264. See id.
265. Id. at 66.
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Bradford might give effective witness to Christ:
I have sometimes thought there could not be a stronger
testimony in favor of Religion or against temporal Enjoyments
even the most rational and manly than for men who occupy the
most honorable and gainful departments and are rising in
reputation and wealth, publicly to declare their unsatisfactoriness
by becoming fervent Advocates in the cause of Christ and I wish
you may give in your Evidence that way. Such Instances have
seldom occurred, therefore they would be more striking and
would instead of a Cloud of Witnesses.26
Thus, at a turning point in his life, as he prepared himself for a
career in public service, Madison advised his good friend from college to
be an effective witness to Christ in his own career. This advice, Noonan
stresses, would also color Madison's career, especially with respect to
the free exercise principle of the First Amendment.267
Madison's commitment to religious liberty was, however, shaped by
more than his early education and desire to witness to Christ in public
affairs. It also was molded by the revulsion he felt at observing first-
hand the misery of persecution.' The Separate Baptists, religious
dissenters who maintained an austere way of life apart from the
established Anglican Church of Virginia, had come to be seen in the late
1760s and early 1770s as a threat to the social order.269 At about the
266. Id Noonan explains the reference to the "Cloud of Witnesses":
The closing allusion was to the Epistle to the Hebrews 12:1-2: "With a cloud of
witnesses to faith around us, we must throw off every encumbrance, every sin to
which we cling and run with resolution the race for which we are entered, our eyes
fixed on Jesus." To follow Jesus in public life was to keep the ministry obliquely in
view.
See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 66.
267. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 67. In an important study
of the religious context of the drafting and ratification of the First Amendment, Harold Berman
called attention to the religious origins of Madison's commitment to religious liberty: "Madison
derived the principle of religious liberty not primarily from its political utility in a pluralist society
but also, and more immediately, from God's own will." Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law:
The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMORY LJ. 777,785 (1986).
268. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1 at 67-8.
269. On the Separate Baptists and the threat they posed, see generally Sandra Rennie,
Virginia's Baptist Persecution, 1765-1778, 12 J. RELIGIOUS HIST. 48 (1982); Rhys Isaac,
Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the Traditional Order in Virginia, 1765
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same time, the established church, with the support of civil authorities,
began a campaign that featured elements of class conflict and religious
oppression.27 Laws requiring preachers to obtain licenses and making
attendance at Anglican services mandatory were enforced in such a way
as to make the Baptists outlaws.vl
A particularly striking event occurred in 1771 when an Anglican
lergyman stopped a preaching Baptist by shoving a horsewhip in his
throat, marching him into a field, and flogging him.m This act prompted
a large outpouring of support for the Baptists. A crowd of 4,000 to 5,000
Baptists gathered in Orange County-James Madison's home county-
to protest this outrage and show their support for the free preaching of
the Gospel by declaring that their license came from "King Jesus," not
from any temporal authority.'m Madison, Noonan surmises, "could not
but have known of the flogging and of the local reaction. ,274
to 1775,31 WM & MARY Q. 345 (3d series, 1974).
270. See Rennie, supra note 269, at 51-59.
271. See Rhys Isaac, "The Rage of Malice of Old Serpent Devil": The Dissenters and the
Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTrE
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
139,140-41 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988); cf. Rennie, supra note 269, at
50-51.
272. See Isaac, Rage of Malice, supra note 271, at 141-42.
273. See id at 142. This gathering was "[p]robably... the biggest mass gathering ever
assembled in Virginia to that date." Id
274. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 67. Madison wrote to
Bradford to discuss in general terms religious persecution in Virginia:
I have indeed as good an Atmosphere at home as the Climate will allow but have
nothing to brag of as to the State and Liberty of my Country. Poverty and Luxury
prevail among all sort: Pride ignorance and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice
and Wickedness among the Laity. This is bad enough. But it is not the worst I have
to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among
some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their own Quota of Imps for
such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this
[time] in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close Gaol for
publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox. I have
neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing relative to this matter, for I have
squabbled and scolded abused and ridiculed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose
that I am without common patience. So I [leave you] to pity me and pray for
Liberty of Conscience [to revive among us].
1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 263, at 106. Cf. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR
COUNTRY, supra note 1 at 68. Analyzing this letter, Noonan writes:
Madison is as serious as the Separate Baptists in seeing the old serpent's malice.
What is sacred, whose liberty must be safeguarded, is the faculty by which right is
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Taking these ideas and events as a foundation for an understanding
of Madison's conception of religious liberty, Noonan analyzes Madison's
contributions to constitutional history. He closely considers three
events: (1) Madison's participation iif the drafting of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights; (2) his drafting of the Memorial and
Remonstrance of 1785; and (3) his leading role in the drafting of the First
Amendment during his term of office in the First Congress.
Throughout, Noonan focuses on the impact Madison's theology had on
the shaping of constitutional law.
In the spring of 1776, after a year of hard fighting between the forces
of colonial rebellion and British troops, the separate states had begun to
frame constitutions for themselves. Madison was one of two
representatives chosen by the freeholders of Orange County to draft a
constitution for the new Virginia government.275 After reporting to the
Convention, he was assigned to the committee charged with preparing a
Declaration of Rights for the new commonwealth, where he served with
such luminaries as Patrick Henry and George Mason. 6
Mason prepared a draft on religious tolerance that retained
Anglicanism as the established Church, but also acknowledged "that all
Men shou'd enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion ....
,1277 Madison rewrote Mason's draft, substituting the phrase "full and
free exercise of [religion]" for "fullest Toleration," stressing that the
discerned from wrong, and by which God speaks to each-the conscience....
Madison ends with a prayer or request for a prayer. Against the background of his
piety, his words are not to be read flippantly or as an expression of futility.
275. See KETCHAM, supra note 247, at 68. Virginia's convention, like those of other states,
were summoned in response to the Second Continental Congress's call to the colonies to "draft
constitutions that would 'establish some form of government' independent of the Crown." See
Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.
L. & HuMANrrms 311,325 (1992).
276. See KETCHAM, supra note 247, at 71.
277. Mason's full statement read:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and
violence; and therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and
unrestrained by the magistrate unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the
peace, the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forebearance, love and charity, towards each other.
See 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 263, at 173.
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right of free exercise was what "all men are equally entitled to," and
inserting language that had the effect of throwing into question the
Anglican Church's establishment. " "The free exercise of religion," to
use Madison's vocabulary, was understood as derived from the duty all
persons have in conscience to worship the Creator of the universe7 9
Noonan looks in particular to the aged Madison's interpretation of this
document-who declares in his Autobiographical Notes that "freedom
of conscience was 'a natural and absolute right' "-as evidence that
Madison understood questions of religion as "beyond the civil power.,,m
Indeed, as Madison subsequently made plain in his Memorial and
Remonstrance, the state has no choice but to recognize the priority of
the believer's freedom if it is to retain its legitimacy 8 '
The Memorial and Remonstrance was prepared in 1784 and 1785 in
response to Patrick Henry's efforts to obtain legislative approval for his
278. Two versions of Madison's draft revisions are found in his PAPERS. Version 1
states:
That Religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it,
being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not of violence or
compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accordg to
the dictates of Conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on
account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges; nor
subjected to any penalties or disabilities under etc.
1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 263, at 174-75.
Version 2 states:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and therefore, that all men are equally entitled to enjoy the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the
magistrate, Unless the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State
are manifestly endangered; And that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian
forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 263, at 174-75.
279. In both versions of Madison's draft revisions, the "free exercise of religion" is derived
from "Religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it .... " Id
280. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 70. Madison's biographer,
Irving Brant has registered a similar conclusion: "To Madison... goes the undisputed credit for
converting a very ordinary pronouncement on religious toleration into a ground-breaking
declaration on the sanctity of the rights of conscience." See BRANT, supra note 248, at 243. Brant
continues: "Madison looked upon liberty of conscience as the fundamental factor in freedom of
religion, and religious freedom, to judge from the concentrated attention he gave, as the
fundamental freedom." Id.
281. See infra notes 289-99 and accompanying text.
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"bill establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion. '"2
The bill began by boldly declaring its purpose as providing for "the
general diffusion of Christian knowledge.., to correct the morals of
men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society."M
Introducing his bill in the fall of 1784, Henry "schedule[d] the third and
final reading of the bill for Christmas Eve, a kind of extraordinary
present to the churches."2 Madison, however, succeeded in postponing
consideration of the bill until the new year and put into publishable
form the notes he had prepared for the floor debate.' Appearing in
pamphlet form under the title of Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments,2 Madison's work was circulated anonymously at
the end of June 1785.2 Intended to crystallize public opinion, the
Memorial and Remonstrance was signed by over 1,500 persons belonging
to a variety of denominations. It substantially contributed to the defeat
of Patrick Henry's bill in the fall of 1785.8
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison asserted that the right
of religious liberty is "unalienable" both because the nature of mankind
required such freedom and because religious worship was of higher
priority than loyalty to the State. Indeed, Madison asserted, religious
liberty is a right among men, but one that rests upon the duty all owe to
the Creator:2  "It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty
is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the
claims of Civil Society. " 291 For this reason Madison maintained that "in
282. See KETCHAM, supra note 247, at 162-63.
283. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POwERs THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 105
284. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 72.
285. Madison's notes from the December, 1784, debate are reprinted in NOONAN, LUSTRE
OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note I at 61--64; the redaction of these notes to publishable form is
discussed at page 72. See id. at 72 (discussing the redaction of those notes to publishable form).
286. The text of the Memorial and Remonstrance is found at 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
287. See id. at 296. Madison did not formally acknowledge his authorship of the
Memorial and Remonstrance until 1826. See id. at 296-97.
288. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 74.
289. Thus, Madison argued that religious liberty was an unalienable right "because the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot
follow the dictates of other men." See Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 286, at 299.
290. See id. ("[Religious liberty] is unalienable also, because what is here a right towards
men, it is a duty towards the Creator").
291. Id. Madison continues:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be
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matters of religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. " 2 2
Madison's subsequent claims flowed from this premise. If civil
society is subordinate to the duty owed to one's Creator and if religious
duties do indeed trump the demands of civil society, then legislative
authority over religion is non-existent:
Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society
at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative
Body. The latter are but creatures and vicegerents of the
former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is
limited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more
necessarily is it limited with regard to constituents. The
preservation of a free Government requires not merely, that the
metes and bounds which separate each department of power be
invariably maintained; but more especially that neither of them
be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the
rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an
encroachment, exceed the commission from they derive their
authority, and are Tyrants.293
Madison went on to establish to his satisfaction that all men "are... to
be considered as retaining an 'equal title to the free exercise of Religion
according to the dictates of Conscience, ' 2'a that the civil magistrate
ought never to be considered "a competent Judge of Religious Truth,"'29
and that the history of the Christian religion demonstrates that it
flourished most vigorously in the days before it became the established
faith of the Roman Empire.29 In making these arguments, Madison
considered as a subject of the Govemour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil
Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a
reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much more must every man who
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.
Id
292. Id
293. Id. at 299-300.
294. IM at 300 (quoting from Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
295. See id. at 301.
296. See id. at 301.
To say that [the Bill establishing a Provision] is [necessary for the Christian faith], is
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drew deeply from Protestant theology.' He closed with a prayer that
the "Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom
[the Memorial and Remonstrance] is addressed, may on the one hand,
turn their Councils from every act which would affront his holy
prerogative,.., and on the other, guide them into every measure which
may be worthy of his [blessing] .... ,298
Noonan concludes:
Concede what Mr. Madison's theology assumes: there is a God
living and distinct from every human creature; this God is the
Creator and the Lawgiver and the Governor of the world; he is
a 'he'; he takes an interest in, and satisfaction from, the homage
humans render him and he will condignly punish humans who
neglect to observe the commands that he communicates
through conscience. Then on what basis can a mere human or
mere association of humans intrude their regulations to prevent
an individual from obeying God?
a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page of it disavows a
dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known
that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the support of
human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them, and not only during the
period of miraculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence and the
ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a Religion not
invented by human policy, must have pre-existed and been supported, before it was
established by human policy.
During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on
trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in
the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry, and
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it
appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its
incorporation with Civil policy.
Id
297. Harold Berman has observed:
The covenant between God and man, Madison said, requires free exercise of
religion, and that covenant takes precedence-both in order of time and degree of
obligation-over the social contract. This statement of Madison makes implicit
reference to the Lutheran doctrine of Two Kingdoms-the heavenly kingdom of
grace and the earthly kingdom of law-as well to the Calvinist doctrine of two
covenants, one between God and man, the other between government and people.
Berman, Religion and Law, supra note 267, at 787.
298. 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON supra note 286, at 304.
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For every upholder of the supremacy of the state, Madison's
defense of free exercise is a scandal, a stumbling-block. The
'great Barrier' stands against the sovereignty of the state. Each
individual's religion 'wholly exempt' from social control? No
qualifications whatever on the right and duty to pay homage to
God as one sees fit? Surely, in the heat of battle, JM
exaggerates! No, his theological premises compel these radical
conclusions.'
In 1787, Madison served as a delegate to the Convention assembled
in Philadelphia for the purpose of preparing a Constitution for the
newly independent states.' The new Constitution prohibited test oaths
for government office, but omitted any affirmative protection for the
rights of conscience.Y In a letter to Jefferson, Madison explained that
he "has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided that it be so
framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the
enumeration."3' Madison was fearful that "the rights of Conscience, in
particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much
more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power" and so
favored their omission from a Bill of Rights.'
Madison soon had occasion to rethink his position. Having failed in
an attempt to win election to the Senate from Virginia, he tried his luck
at winning a seat in the new House of Representatives. In a close
election, which he believed he might lose due to manipulation by Patrick
Henry of the composition of congressional districts, Madison struck an
alliance with local Baptist leaders, including the influential John Leland,
author of The Rights of Conscience.3 Madison assured the Baptists of
his support for a "specific provision" on "the Rights of Conscience," and
299. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 75.
300. See generally WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NExT:. JAMES MADISON
AND THE FOUNDING (1992). Cf. JAMES H. HUDSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE
AMERICAN REPuBLIC 78 (1998) (assessing Madison's contributions to religious liberty in 1788
and 1789).
301. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY supra note 1, at 75-76.
302. See Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (17 October 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
303. Id
304. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 78. On the importance of
Leland to the cause of religious liberty, see ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 12-13 (1998).
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was rewarded by a close victory over James Monroe. 5 As Noonan
observes: "With the aid of these dedicated evangelicals, by the active
intervention of the preachers in politics, Mr. Madison became the
spokesman for religious freedom in the Congress that was to begin the
government of the United States."36
Almost immediately after being seated in the new House, Madison
embarked on a campaign to amend the Constitution by a Bill of Rights.
His great concern was the damage that could be done to fundamental
rights by an unrestrained majoritarian principle.' In notes he prepared
for floor debate on the Bill of Rights, he labeled two rights-speech and
conscience-as natural fights the protection of which was the object of
the Bill of Rights.'
Noonan details the progress of Madison's efforts to secure
protection for these rights. Madison initially proposed an amendment
to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which would have declared
the federal government incompetent in matters of religion.' He
followed with a proposal that omitted reference to the free exercise of
religion, but instead would have protected "the rights of conscience"
and banned a nationally established church."' A subsequent draft
ambiguously suggested that the amendment's protection of the religious
conscience might be binding on the states, a position from which
Madison had to retreat." Yet another proposed amendment wasintended to confer constitutional protection to conscientious objectors
305. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 78.
306. Id-
307. In his letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In
our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is
the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.
Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 302, at 298.
30& See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 79.
309. The proposed text read: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or under any pretext infringed." Quoted in
NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 79.
310. Id. at 80. For a history of the successive drafts, see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A.
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY at 85-88 (1996).
311. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 80.
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in time of war. After much legislative give and take, a congressional
committee, of which Madison was a member, produced the language
that we commonly-but mistakenly-call the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment 3"
As finally ratified, Noonan asserts, the First Amendment's
protection of religion results from a specifically religious view of
political society:
In the ultimate and absolute relation of each individual to God
lies the limitation on civil society and civil government on which
[Madison] insists. Without that relation, why should the
individual not be absorbed by the community, why should a
society be constrained to respect conscience? With that relation
to a Creator, Governor, Judge in existence for each individual,
with that personal responsibility to a personal God, a
government of human beings must be a government of limited
powers. The theology underwrites the political theory on the
competencies of government. The great Barrier which defends
the rights of the people, that barrier central to [Madison's]
theory of government, depends upon the people having other
business than the ordering of the temporal society, its goods and
goals. By their consciences the people relate to God. The faith
that there is a governing God is fundamental. 4
312. See Noonan, Religious Liberty at the Stake, supra note 29, at 463. Cf. Ellis M. West,
The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors
to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367 (1993-94).
313. See Noonan, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 80-81. Noonan explains
what he understands the Amendment to have accomplished:
In two prepositional phrases (not clauses) the job was done. The first phrase
assumed that establishments of religion existed as they did in fact exist in several of
the states; the amendment restrained the power of Congress to affect them. The
second phrase was absolute in its denial of federal legislative power to inhibit
religious exercise. Succinct, the amendment referred to religion twice but used the
term only once: no room to argue that the term changed its meaning in the second
reference. Pleonastically the practice that could not be prohibited was denominated
"free."
Id at 81.
314. Id. at 89. John Witte has observed: "The American founders revolutionized the
Western tradition of religious liberty. But they also remained within this Western tradition,
dependent on its enduring and evolving postulates about God and humanity, authority and
liberty, church and state." JOHN WIT=E, JR., ESSENTIAL RIG-TS AND LIBERTIES 27 (typescript)
(forthcoming). Witte continues:
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C. Noonan's Madison: An Assessment
An important essay by Irving Brant, a leading Madison biographer,
notes that "[t]o James Madison... freedom of religion was the
fundamental item on which all other forms of civil liberty depended."315
Brant, however, treats the foundations of this belief in cursory fashion.
Regarding Madison's experiences at Princeton, Brant proposes that
"[t]here is more reason to believe that hostility to church establishment
led Madison to Princeton, than that the choice of a school fixed his
principles. 316 Brant notes that "Madison was not a church member," '17
and that "[in college he traveled with a slightly impious crowd-
impious by eighteenth-century standards-the sophisticated American
Whigs as opposed to the devout and fervent Cliosophists." ' When
considering Madison's theological formation, Brant takes no notice of
Madison's close studies with Witherspoon, or Madison's advice to
Bradford. He never explains why Madison considered religious
freedom the foundation of all other civil liberties.
Brant is not alone in his view. Although they fail to define the term,
Arlin Adams and Charles Emmerich describe Madison-together with
Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine-as an "Enlightenment
Separationist. 319  Adams and Emmerich concede that Madison was
more conventional in his beliefs than either Jefferson or Paine.3'2 They
also acknowledge that "Madison regarded liberty of conscience as the
most sacred inalienable right," although, like Brant, they never explain
the origin of this preoccupation or why it should matter.3 ' Adrienne
This Western pedigree of the American experiment in religious liberty might be a
source of comfort to modern skeptics who see in it a betrayal of the classic ideals of
Western Christendom. This Western pedigree of the American experiment might
also be a source of warning to modern enthusiasts who see in it a universal formula
of the good life and good society to be enforced throughout the world.
Id at 27-28.
315. Irving Brant, Madison On the Separation of Church and State, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 3
(3d series, 1951). Brant continues: "Its maintenance [religious liberty] would not automatically
preserve the entire liberty of the citizen. But without it the other rights were sure to be
destroyed." Id-
316. Id. at4.
317. Id. Brant adds that Madison "attended church (regardless of denomination) with
regularity ...." Id.
318. Id.
319. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 304, at 22.
320. See id. at 22 ("Madison, while circumspect about his religious beliefs, adhered to views
closer to traditional Christian doctrine [than Jefferson or Paine]').
321. Id. at 25.
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Koch, for her part, observes that Madison believed religion to be
"exempt from the authority of society," but never explicates the
theological foundation of this belief.' Her James Madison was
essentially a secular man taking a brave stand against "spiritual
tyranny.""22 Unsurprisingly, another biographer observes that in his
youth, "Madison's political feelings were most aroused, oddly enough,
not by the imperial issues of trade and taxation, but by the repressions
and abuses of the Anglican Church in Virginia."'
Noonan criticizes this dominant interpretation of Madison by
attacking the habit of mind that lies at its core: the desire to fit together
under the single rubric of "Enlightenment" as many of the diverse
personalities and thinkers who peopled the American Founding as
possible?2 In truth, the term "Enlightenment" as applied to America is
of recent vintage and does not reflect the actual experiences of the
Founding generation: "prior to World War II scholars generally
confined the use of the term 'Enlightenment' to the eighteenth century
German movement known as die AuIjkldrung [" enlightening"] ";32 Fifty
years ago neither French nor English possessed an equivalent term to
Aufkldrung."32 Lacking proper historical grounding, the term has
322. ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 29
(1950).
323. Id. Koch's essentially secular interpretation of Madison is revealed even more clearly
in ADRIENNE KOCH, MADISON'S 'ADVICE To MY COUNTRY' (1966). Ignoring Madison's
religious background, she explains his commitment to religious freedom in terms of his
anthropology:.
Freedom of religion is essential because of the nature of man and the nature of
human thought. Men are reasonable creatures who inquire before they believe. To
compel them to believe, without respect for what appears to them to be sufficient or
convincing evidence, will perhaps exact outward obedience but it will not produce
belief.
Id. at 21. She explains Madison's choice of Christian language in the Memorial and Remonstrance
as a rhetorical tactic designed to appeal to an audience that was "almost entirely Christian
believers of various sorts." Id. at 22.
324. THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JAMES MADISON, A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS, I,
26 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1974). Other efforts to explain the foundations of Madison's concern
for free inquiry by using a secular frame of reference have similarly gone astray. Thus one recent
work attempts to wed Madison's regard for the rights of conscience to, of all things, a neo-
Lockean concern for the ownership of one's conscience. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE
MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 103
(1996).
325. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 85-86.
326. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment, supra note 275 at 311, n.1.
327. John Lough, Reflections on 'Enlightenment' and 'Lumidres, in L'ETA DEi LUMI: STUDI
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expanded to the point of actually distorting historical understanding.'
Noonan accepts this line of reasoning when he describes
"Enlightenment" as "[a] catchword and a catchall [that] embraces every
extoller of reason from [John] Locke to Voltaire. " 329 The term has come
to "encompass such a spectrum of religious convictions that the verbal
convergence is not helpful in discerning the lines of division."
31
When Madison is seen on his terms, rather than through the prism of
a superimposed "Enlightenment," more reflective of twentieth-century
rather than eighteenth-century preoccupations, Noonan argues, the
religious foundations of his public thought are illuminated. Explicating
the Memorial and Remonstrance, Noonan writes:
[Madison's] central public testimony to his religious beliefs is the
Memorial and Remonstrance. Here the only question, as his
notes have it, is are Relig. Estabts. necessy for Religion? not Is
Rel. necessy? The answer comes from the Christian Religion
itself. That religion is not invented by human policy. That
religion is this precious gift. That religion is, in the most positive
and pervasive metaphor of the age, a light. The metaphor, used
by a Christian, echoes the first chapter of the Gospel according
to John: Christ is the true light which lights everyone entering the
world. Hence, JM speaks interchangeably of the light of
Christianity the light of revelation. This religion is to prevail not
by force, which is repudiated by every page of the religion, and
not by unchristian timidity, but by evidence and example. By
these means Truth will make its victorious progress to be
imparted to the whole race of mankind.
STORICI SUL SETrECENTO EUROPEO IN ONORE DI FRANCO VENTURI 36 (R. Ajello et al. eds.,
1985) (quoted in Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment, supra note 275, at 311, n.1). (Sixty-
five years ago, measured from today).
328.
In recent decades, "Enlightenment" has been used indiscriminately to refer to
philosophies and times as far apart from each other as those of the early
seventeenth-century France of Descartes and the mid-eighteenth-century France of
Diderot, as well as the England of John Milton or Matthew Hale and the England of
Thomas Paine or Jeremy Bentham over a century later. Indeed, some American
historians have even spoken of an "American Enlightenment," which is surely a
distortion.
Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment, supra note 275, at 311-12.
329. NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 86.
330. l
[83:367
THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM
Public argument is not the same as personal conviction. But
public argument that employs religious belief for its own ends,
that makes an Engine of religion, precisely parallels the
exploitation of religion by government that JM denounced in the
Memorial as wickedness. If he himself had made religion
instrumental in this fashion it would make him the hypocrite no
one believes he is. In the Memorial JM addresses Christians as a
fellow Christian; he speaks as a believer in Christianity's special
light; his argument looks to the evangelization of the world."
If biographers of Madison have misunderstood their subject by
failing to account for the theological foundations of his commitment to
religious liberty, so have American courts and constitutional historians.
Noonan's unitary interpretation of the First Amendment's origins and
scope-seeing a single religion clause aimed at conserving the good of
liberty of conscience in religious affairs-particularly challenges those
who have singled out the "Establishment Clause" as embodying the
First Amendment's governing principle where religion is concerned.
Such an approach had its genesis with the case of Everson v. Board
of Education. 2 In that case, Justice Black, writing for the Court, wrote
of an "establishment of religion"333 clause which served to erect "a wall
331. Id- at 87.
332. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
333. Id. at 15. Noonan chides Justice Black's choice of words in an imaginary dialogue
between a newly appointed federal judge, Samuel Simple, and his clerks:
I would have thought respecting an establishment meant taking into account an
establishment-in other words, the phrase in the Bill of Rights assumed that religious
establishments existed and instructed Congress not to take any establishment into
account, either by endowing a state-established church or by penalizing one. Am I
being too simple?
"You're being pretty perceptive," said Boaltman, a second law clerk, "but you're a
bit out of date. Everyone's now agreed that 'respecting an establishment' now
means 'establishing.' They call it the 'Establishment Clause.' It'd be sheer pedantry
to stick to the original language. In any case, the original language didn't seem to
refer to anything once the states disestablished their churches. So to give the
Establishment Clause a function, you had to read it in a kind of revised way."
"I thought I once heard that at least Justice Black was a great stickler for reading the
Constitution literally," Simple observed. "When it said 'No law,' for example, he
said it meant 'no law.'"
"He was a stickler when it suited his purposes," Harvardman replied, "which wasn't
all the time."
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of separation between church and State , 34 and which "must be kept
high and impregnable."335 Both Black and Justice Wiley Rutledge, in a
dissent that in tone and substance resembles Black's majority analysis,
made use of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance36 Rutledge
claimed, based on his reading, that "for [Madison,] religion was a wholly
private matter .... ,33 Missing entirely from both majority and dissent
is recognition of the religious roots of Madison's belief that religion
must be exempt from state control because it represents a loyalty prior
to the state, and that protection of free inquiry in religious matters is the
only secure means by which the truth of faith is propagated and
accepted, and the world thereby is evangelized.3"
The Black-Rutledge reading of Madison introduced into
constitutional jurisprudence a strand of thought, grown more
pronounced in recent years, to see the First Amendment as protecting
society from religion.39  Thus in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme
Court considered evidence of religious motivation on the part of state
legislators as decisive to its application of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.u
Not surprisingly, scholars and commentators have also begun to
NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 182-83.
334. 330 U.S. at 16.
335. Id- at 18.
336. See id at 12 (Black, J.); 37-39, 63-72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
337. Id at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). This of a man who urged a correspondent, a future
attorney general of the United States, to keep the ministry obliquely in view and to allow his
Christian calling to serve as a "cloud of witnesses!"
338. The historical premises of the Everson case have been thoroughly scrutinized and
found to be flawed. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987). Bradley concludes that "the justices should confess their [historical] sin and embark at the
earliest opportunity on the path first forsaken in 1947." Id at 135.
339. This is a criticism voiced by Mark De Wolfe Howe. See MARK DE WOLFE HOWE,
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOvERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 136-39 (1965).
340. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987). In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote:
It is important to stress that the purpose forbidden by Lemon is the purpose to
"advance religion."... Our cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause
forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions. We surely would
not strike down a law providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if
it could be demonstrated, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds
would not have been approved.
Id. at 614-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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question the philosophical? ' and constitutionaf' 2 bases of religiously
motivated political participation.
Noonan repudiates these developments as unfaithful to the guiding
principle of the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty. He
concedes "[t]he great ambiguity of the First Amendment" :
What free exercise meant to Mr. Madison it had not meant to
[George] Mason, [Patrick] Henry, and the assembly that
adopted the Declaration of Rights, and what free exercise
meant to Mr. Madison was not what it meant to the First
Congress that petitioned the president to set a day of
thanksgiving to God; created chaplaincies; and made grants of
public property for the support of religion.3"
But despite these different understandings, Noonan, following
Madison, finds the core of free exercise to be "no government
interference with the obligation of conscience. "35 Noonan, furthermore,
is willing to extend the requirement of governmental noninterference
with the demands of conscience to protect the political activities of
religious believers.3 Noonan's reading of the First Amendment's
Religion Clause thus seems to come closer to the view articulated by the
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut than the views found in the progeny of
341. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICHONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988) (arguing that religious believers should ordinarily avoid recourse to religiously-based
arguments and should instead rely on publicly-accessible ones); Jeremy Waldron, Religious
Contributions in Public Deliberations, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 817 (1993) (criticizing reliance on
religiously-grounded arguments in making public policy).
342. See, eg., Richard H. Jones, Concerning Secularists' Proposed Restrictions on the Role of
Religion in American Politics, 8 BYU J. PUB. LAW 343 (1994) (critiquing secularist constitutional
arguments).
343. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 82.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 82.
346. In justifying political activity by Catholics, Noonan has written:
[I]t is the duty of every citizen and every officeholder to obey the dictates of his
conscience. If a Catholic voter or officeholder forms his conscience by consulting
the teaching of the Church, he does no more or less than any conscientious citizen or
politician who consults the sources of truth he holds in highest regard. Every
conscientious person, acting according to his conscience, imposes his values on the
community.
See Noonan, The Bishops and the Ruling Class, supra note 9, at 141.
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Everson."47 Indeed, Noonan recognizes that American history has been
deeply enriched by periodic religious crusades-against slavery,'
against Mormon polygamy, 3 9 against alcohol350 and in favor of civil
rights.3"' Even where these crusades ultimately failed, as in the case of
Prohibition, the American people benefited from the experience.
Finally, it must be noted that Noonan elevates Madison and his role
in the creation of the American doctrine of religious liberty at the
expense of Thomas Jefferson. Although Jefferson receives fairly
complete treatment in The Believer and the Powers that Are,3 3 he is
347. The Cantwell Court declared, regarding both the "establishment" and "free exercise"
aspects of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.... The constitutional
inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Cf. HOWE, supra note 339, at 137-38
(comparing the treatment of "establishment" by the Cantwell and Everson Courts).
348. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 250-52.
349. IL at 252-54.
350. Il at 254-55.
351. Id- at 256-58.
352. Noonan has written:
Crusades do, when successful, establish as the law of the land what begins as the
religious perception of a moral requirement. Employing religion as a political
institution, they mold the morals of the country. They lead to the enactment into
law of religious-moral discourse. At the same time they flourish because of the First
Amendment. The government is not empowered to restrain them. They respond to
imperatives that transcend the secular state. They are expressions of the demands of
conscience. They have played a major part in the American experiment of Free
Exercise.
Id at 259-60.
353. See NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE, supra note 29, at 98-104.
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subordinated to Madison in The Lustre of Our Country.3m To be sure,
Noonan acknowledges that Madison owed a considerable debt to
Jefferson, but Noonan's focus is on the First Amendment and the
principles that informed its drafting. These principles, Noonan argues
persuasively, were Madisonian and religious in character, not
Jeffersonian and deist.
D. "Quota of Imps"355
It has been contended that many members of the Congress that
approved the First Amendment believed the Religion Clause to be
jurisdictional; that it declared Congress incompetent in religious matters
because legislative supervision of religion was the prerogative of the
several states. 5 Certainly, it is the case that, for the most part, the
relationship of the states to religion remained much as it had during
colonial times.'
The New England states, with the exception of Rhode Island,
continued to maintain their old colonial establishments, although they
also agreed to tolerate dissenting sects. Connecticut, for instance,
retained its Congregationalist establishment, although after 1784 state
law provided:
[members of] all denominations of Christians differing in their
religious Sentiments from the People of the established Societies
354. See NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY, supra note 1, at 69-72,74-77.
355. John T. Noonan, Jr., Quota of Imps, supra note 29. The "quota of imps" originates in a
letter from James Madison to William Bradford, responding to the latter's concern about
religious persecution. Madison writes:
I have indeed as good an Atmosphere at home as the Climate will allow: but have
nothing to brag of as to the State and Liberty of my Country. Poverty and Luxury
prevail among all sort: Pride ignorance and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice
and Wickedness among the Laity. This is bad enough But It is not the worst I have
to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among
some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for such
business.
Letter of James Madison to William Bradford (January 24, 1774), in 1 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 104, supra note 263, at 106.
356. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTrrIUIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18-34 (1995).
357. See NICHOLAS TROTF, THE LAWS OF THE BRITSH PLANTATIONS IN AMERICA
RELATING TO THE CHURCH AND THE CLERGY, RELIGION AND LEARNING (1771) (providing a
comprehensive overview of colonial legislation).
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in this State, whether of the Episcopal Church... Separates...
or Baptists,... or Quaker, or any other denomination... who
attended and supported the gospel ministry could have a
certificate signed by an officer of their own church and be
exempted from the support of the established ministry.5
Although members of faiths other than the Protestant Christians
specified by statute were still required to pay taxes to support the
established ministry, Zephania Swift, one of the leading lights of post-
colonial jurisprudence, argued "that Jews, Mahomedans, and others
enjoyed perfect religious freedom in Connecticut, on the ground that
they could practice their religion there even if they had to pay for the
support of the Christian one."359
Vermontm and New Hampshire, for their part, although explicitly
eschewing establishment, nevertheless provided public support for
religion."' The case of Muzzy v. Wilkins' raised the issue of the New
Hampshire establishment. Jeremiah Smith, another leading light of
New England justice, defended the proposition that "[n]o human
government has a right to set up a standard of belief, because it is itself
fallible. " Even so, Smith continued, no one could maintain "'that the
civil magistrate may not lawfully punish certain offences against the
unalterable and essential principles of natural and revealed religion'
such as 'blasphemy, reviling religion, profanation of the Sabbath, etc.' "
358. CURRY, supra note 222, at 181. Cf. WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND
DISSENT, 1630-1883: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE II 962-
84 (1971) (discussing in detail the Connecticut situation).
359. CURRY, supra note 222, at 184.
360. The Vermont Constitution of 1786 attempted to reconcile both religious liberty and
state involvement in the support of Christian observance:
[N]o authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatsoever,
that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of
conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship: Nevertheless, every sect or
denomination of Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep
up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the
revealed will of God.
Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1085,1100, n.57 (1995).
361. See CURRY, supra note 222, at 189.
362. JEREMIAH SMITH, DECISIONS OF THE SUPERIOR AND SUPREME COURTS OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE 3 (1879).
363. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 358, at 864.
364. Id
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Noonan's own concern is with the progress of the establishment of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Article II of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, authored by John Adams, spoke of the right and
duty "of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons to worship the
SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and preserver of the
Universe. "3 Article III, however, which Adams did not write but did
vote for in Convention, provided for what one leading scholar has
termed an "institutional establishment" that furnished substantial aid
and comfort to Congregationalist religious establishment.'
Noonan begins his analysis of the Massachusetts establishment with
the use of the criminal law, particularly the law of blasphemy, to enforce
broad acceptance of biblical truths, and considers the case of Abner
Kneeland.' In sometimes scatological language, Kneeland questioned
the Virgin Birth and challenged Unitarian Universalists on the
consistency of their beliefs.39 Charged with violating the Massachusetts
Act against Blasphemy,' ° Kneeland sought at trial the protection of the
365. See Noonan, 'Quota of lmps,' supra note 29.
366. John Witte, Jr., 'A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion.' John Adams
and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & STATE 213,235 (1999).
367. See id. at 242-50 (discussing the drafting of Article III, and the criticisms and defenses
offered of its establishment of religion).
368. Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29, at 171-75. Cf. LEONARD W. LEVY,
BLASPHEMY IN MASsACHUSE'rS: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE ABNER KNEELAND
CASE (1973) (providing a complete documentary record of Kneeland's prosecution).
369. Kneeland was indicted in 1833 for having declared in December of the previous year
that
1. Hottentots cut off one testicle; a Frenchman believes in two; but 'that same
Frenchman... firmly believes that Jesus Christ was born without any testicles at all.
2. God is in "a curious and strange predicament" because of "the heterogenous
mass of contrariety he has to hear and answer every day."
3. Universalists believe in a god which I do not.... Universalists believe in Christ,
which I do not; but believe that the whole story concerning him is as much a fable
and a fiction, as that of the god Prometheus....
Universalists believe in miracles, which I do not; but believe that every pretension to
them can either be accounted for by natural principles or else is to be attributed to
mere trick and imposture. Universalists believe in the resurrection of the dead, in
immortality and eternal life, which I do not, but believe that death is an eternal
extinction of life to the individual who possesses it, and that no individual life is, ever
was, or ever will be eternal.
Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29, at 172.
370. The Act of Blasphemy provided:
That if any person shall wilfully blaspheme the holy name of God, by denying,
1999]
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
Commonwealth's Declaration of Rights? Lemuel Shaw, writing for the
majority of the Supreme Judicial Court, focused his analysis on
Kneeland's denial of Universalist principles.37 He omitted
consideration of Kneeland's attacks on the Virgin Birth, or miracles, or
cursing, or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government or final
judging of the world, or by cursing or reproaching Jesus Christ, or the Holy Ghost,
of by cursing or contumeliously reproaching the holy word of God, that is the
canonical scriptures, contained in the books of the Old and New Testaments, or by
exposing them, or any part of them, to contempt and ridicule; which books are as
follows [the books are named], every person so offending shall be punished by
imprisonment, not exceeding twelve months, by sitting in the pillories, or by sitting
on the gallows, with a rope about the neck, or binding to the good behaviour, at the
discretion of the Supreme Judicial Court before whom convictions may be,
according to the aggravation of the offense.
Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29 at 171.
371. The Declaration of Rights provided in part:
And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate,
for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
his own conscience; or for his religious professions or sentiments; provided he doth
not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.
Id. at 172.
372. Shaw wrote:
The sentence quoted is this; "Universalists believe in a god which I do not." It was
contended by the defendant that from the use of a small letter in the word god, and
from the punctuation, the grammatical construction was, that it was used in a
peculiar sense, as the creed, or tenets, or form of belief, of the Universalists, as we
speak of the god of Mahommedans, or Hindoos, or Chinese, the being understood,
conceived and apprehended by the Mahommedans or Pagans respectively, and that
the same form of words was not infrequently used among different sects of
Christians. The opinion expressed by the Court was, that in its obvious grammatical
construction, it was equivalent to a denial of his belief in the existence of any God,
that is, any God other than the material universe;... The Court are of opinion, that
this construction was correct.
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206,223-24. The Court concluded:
And we think, from a fair construction of the report, that [the trial judge] instructed
the jury that a wilful denial of God, his creation, etc., that is, a denial with the
injurious, unlawful intent, to impair and destroy the veneration due to him, as an
intelligent creator, governor, and final judge of the world, implied in the word wilful,
did constitute the offence intended to be prohibited and punished by the statute,
although no words of malediction, reproach, or contumely towards God, Jesus
Christ, or the Scriptures, were coupled with it.
Id. at 225.
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God's response to prayers.3 3 Denial of Universalist tenets, however,
amounted to a violation of the blasphemy act.374
But while the outcome in Commonwealth v. Kneeland kept alive the
law on blasphemy, in other respects the religious establishment came
under more effective challenge in the opening decades of the nineteenth
century. The Constitution of 1780 had required of office-holders not
only a general affirmation of their Christian beliefs, but had also
demanded abjuration of loyalties to foreign powers-both to Great
Britain and to the claims of spiritual jurisdiction advanced by the
pope?5  Through the cooperation of leading Protestants and Jean
Cheverus, the first Catholic bishop of Boston, these requirements were
abolished in 1820.376
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, as enforced, also made
provision as well for the financial support of "public teacher[s]" who
were "the equivalent of 'ordained Protestant clergy[men.]"' '3
Enforcement of this provision eventually became a weapon in the hands
of Congregationalists and Unitarians seeking control of the parish
churches of Massachusetts." Rejection of this system by constitutional
amendment in 1834 still left the Protestant churches of the state greatly
enriched by its abolition.
373. See Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29, at 174.
374. Noonan concludes:
Shaw was a Unitarian and Unitarianism was then the religion of many of the ruling
elite of Massachusetts. It was a good deal more rationalistic than the Trinitarian
Congregationalism from which it had emerged, but it could not have reduced to a
mere utilitarianism or a humanism detached from Christianity. It was a scriptural
religion. Unitarians were "fervently biblical" and wrestled "with every verse of St.
Paul." An Emerson could step out of "the Morgue" of Unitarianism and with legal
impunity translate Christianity into a set of lofty ideals and vague metaphors.
Kneeland's Voltairean skepticism was different; it was in fact deeply disturbing to
the peace of those who had balanced Scripture and modem thought and had made
for themselves a mental universe they found intelligible and Christian.
Iii at 174-75.
375. See U at 175-76.
376. See id. at 178-79; see also generally CHARLES P. HANSON, NECESSARY VIRTUE: THE
PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW ENGLAND (1998) (discussing the
conflict between Catholics and Protestants and occasional areas of cooperation in the
revolutionary era).
377. See Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra, note 29 at 180.
378. See iUt at 185-87.
379. See id. at 187 ("In the jargon of today's corporate world, the Unitarian and
Congregationalist churches received 'golden handshakes' on parting with tax support. They were
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Finally, Noonan discusses Harvard College, which had been founded
for the purpose of providing education in religion and had been
dedicated Christo et Ecclesiae-"to Christ and the Church."'  Harvard
was to be governed by two authorities: a Board of Overseers, which
"reflected in some ways the distinctively scriptural sanctions and
theories of what the College was for the Bay Colony theocracy" 18' and
the Corporation, which exercised the more traditional offices of
collegiate governance.' Efforts by Daniel Webster and Joseph Story in
the Constitutional Convention of 1820 to disestablish the College
proved unsuccessful.' Noonan observes that "[o]nly in 1865 was there
a substantial separation of this child of the church from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts."'
Early nineteenth century legal reasoning was frequently saturated
with religious content and imagery. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court declared in 1844 that Christianity was a part of the common law,
at least in the "qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are
admitted. "3 Noonan, however, is concerned with the ways in which the
principle undergirding the First Amendment's protection of religious
liberty began to take root in this environment. Madison's doctrine
helped shape legal reasoning and helped condition public opinion.'
The "multiplicity of sects," which Madison viewed as crucial for
mitigating religious conflicty contributed to the partial
on their own, but with handsome endowments.").
380. I& at 189.
381. George Huntston Williams, Religion, Law and Revolution in the Shaping of Harvard
College 1636-1708, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
RELIGION (A TRIBUrE TO HAROLD J. BERMAN) 123, 133 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S.
Alexander eds., 1988).
382- See id. at 133,138-49.
383. See Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29, at 190.
384. Id
385. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844). The Vidal Court was
explicating the law of Pennsylvania and subsequently cited to the Pennsylvania case of Updegraff
v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824). An important study of the role Christianity
played in early constitutional commentaries is Daniel L. Dreisbach, 'In Search of a Christian
Commonwealth'. An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to
God and the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 927 (1996).
386. See Noonan, Quota of Imps, supra note 29, at 192.
387. Madison wrote in 1788:
Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom
arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and which is the best
and only security for religious belief in any society. For where there is such a variety
of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.
[83:367
THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM
disestablishment that Noonan sketches. One could witness in
Massachusetts the slow beginning of a trajectory away from the religious
establishments that had characterized much of western history and
toward a greater religious liberty for all.'
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Starting from the premise that "religion is a private matter,"3 Leo
Pfeffer, writing in 1953, proposed a historiography of church and state
that can best be described as Manichean. On the one hand, he finds the
forces of state coercion: theocratic Israelite princes and prophets,' 9
coercive Roman emperors both Christian and pagan,39' popes who
sought worldly supremacy,39 and Protestant reformers who sought the
extirpation of heresy.3' On the other hand, he finds bold voices for
tolerance, even religious liberty, who were "centuries in advance of
[their] age."3" The adoption of the principle of separation of church and
state was, in Pfeffer's judgment, largely the result of rationalist and
enlightenment ideas.395 He finds it "paradoxical" that the enlightenment
idea of separation had to strike an "alliance [with] the theological
James Madison, General Defense of the Constitution, 11 PAPERS OF MADISON 130.
388. However, Noonan cautions his readers that we could easily become members of
another establishment. Alluding to Madison's characterization of defenders of religious
establishment as the devil's imps, Noonan observes:
Our own measure today is Madison's: discrimination against any denomination does
strike as reprehensible. Persecution, we know, is perverse. But believers as we all
are in religious freedom "to the utmost," perhaps we should stop before we embrace
Madison's theological characterization of the champions of the establishment. We
too may be part of an establishment. Our faults may be no more manifest to
ourselves than were those to themselves of John Adams and the other imps who
made Massachusetts.
Noonan, 'Quota of Imps,' supra note 29, at 192-93.
389. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 3 (1953).
390. See id at 4-8.
391. See id at 9-14.
392. See id. at 14-18.
393. See id. at 20-25.
394. Id. at 18. Pfeffer here is writing of Marsilius of Padua, the fourteenthi-century defender
of the rights of the northern Italian cities against the Pope. See id. The anachronism inherent in
labelling certain historical figures as friends of progress and others as enemies of progress has
long been discredited among professional historians as "whig history." See generally HERBERT
BUTrERFELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931).
395. See PFEFFER, supra note 392, at 92-93.
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orthodoxy of the Great Awakening" in order to prevail."
By contrast, the corpus of Noonan's work stands in elegant
refutation of this sort of simple dualism. Noonan sees within the earliest
layers of the Judeo-Christian tradition elements that helped shape the
doctrine of religious liberty as well as elements that contributed to a
thousand years of religious persecution. He is sensitive to the
cross-currents at play in the thought of St. Augustine, who advised
Christian judges to show mercy and who justified coercion of heretics as
an act of charity. He is aware also of the important, though subordinate,
role conscience played in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. These two
thinkers helped both to construct the conceptual apparatus used to
justify the suppression of dissent, but also raised the sorts of questions
that led ultimately to the undermining of the system.
Noonan also refutes those who believe that the birth and
development of religious liberty in the New World was an inevitable
process. He reminds us that Quakers were hanged on Boston Common
and that the mainstream of colonial thought very much favored religious
establishment and the forcible suppression of dissenters. The ultimate
success the advocates of religious liberty enjoyed in seeing the
enactment of the First Amendment's Religion Clause was very much the
product of singular insight and opportunity.
Noonan similarly confronts those who see the development of legal
protections for religious liberty as a product of "Enlightenment" ideas.
Pfeffer's paradox-the alliance between enlightenment and faith that
produced the First Amendment-is resolved in Noonan's scholarship.
The First Amendment's protection of religion, Noonan establishes, is
the product of theological insight. Additionally, its enactment into law
owes much to the involvement of religious persons in politics. After all,
James Madison was elected to the First Congress with the support of
John Leland and the Baptists of the Piedmont.
Furthermore, the constitutional protection of the First Amendment
favors the religious believer in his or her relationship to the state. James
Madison exempted religious belief from the authority of the state
because belief in a deity represented a loyalty prior to the state.
Freedom of conscience, in Madison's estimation, was a right conferred
by nature. The state is thus essentially incompetent in religious matters.
The fundamental principle at work is the protection of the believer's
freedom to believe as his or her conscience demands, to live out that
396. Id at 92.
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belief in the arena of the world, and to evangelize by word and deed.
This much, Noonan makes clear in his narrative account of the Western
experience of the relationship between believer and state power, is the
lesson of history.

